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1 U.

" 0We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs as a violation of the constitu4,.
of the United States, and a crime against free institutions,
and we especially object to government by injunction as a
new and higi.ly dahgerous form of oppression by which federal
judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of
citizens become at once legislators, judges and executioners'.
Such was the languiage of the platform of the democratic party, adopted at Chicago, July 9, 1896.

It gave to

the wokld a new phrase, 'Government by Injunction'/

As

generally accepted and understood the expression applies
particularly to the use of the injunction as a means of
settling the labor troubles known as strikes and boycotts,the eruptions of the industrial world, caused by the eternal
struggle between capital and labor.
We are told that once upon a time the plebians of
ancient Pome becoming dissatisfied with the oppressive conduct of the patricians, seceded in a body to the sacred
mount, declaring that they would not remain a part of the
body politic unless the patricians made certain concessions
to them.

At this juncture Menenius Aggrippa addressed the

pleb"ans as follows:-

"

Once upon a time, the other members

of the body conspired against the stomach; they declared
they had all the work to do, while the stomach lay quietly
in the middle of the body and enjoyed, without any labor,
everything theybrought it.

So they all quit work, and de-

termined to starve the stomach into submission.

But soon

they discovered* thatwhile they,were starving the stomach,

they too, were being starved, and that the whole body was
wasting away."

The social aspect of the question presented

by this little fable, we do not intend to discuss, but we
will confine this thesis to a treatment of the subject from
a purely legal standpoint.
We can describe the general opinion of the public on
the question in no better, manner than by the following language of Walter Murphy (1894 Utah Bar Ass'n.)

He says:-

If by a poe/tic license we should personify the ancient
and honorable writ of injunction, and inagine it as lapsing
into a state of unconsciousnessri so to speak, say half a century ago, and a's now waking up, like Rip Van Winkle after
his twenty years of slumber, and scrutinizing its present
condition as reflected in certain contemporary ideas of some
vogue, it seems certain that it would be as much bewilderedb
by some aspects of its present self as was Irving's legendary Dutchman.

Unlike the latter, however,

it would per-

ceive in itself no trace of the rheumatics; but on the contrary would find itself endowed with divers athletic, not
to say acrobatic capabilities of which, in its earlier age,
it had not dreamed!

If Mr. Murphy had carried the figure

a little further he would have come nearer the true situation.

It is related that "it was some time before he (Rip)

could get into the regular track of xftaixx gossip, or could
comprehend
be made to xxIxx±K
the strange events that had taken
place during his torpor"

However, he finally "got on" and

having fresumed his old walks and habits; he soon found many
of his forme

cronies, though all rather the worse fot the

3/
wear and tear of time; and preferred making friends amongkk
the rising generatio n, with whom he soon grew into great
favor'.'
The whole legal controversy ma,; be tersely stated in
the words of Ashujrst, J , in Pasley V
P

63.

of is,

Freeman, 3 D. & E.

He says, "Another argument which has been made use
that this is a

new case, and that 4there is no prece-

dent for such an action.

Where cases are new in their

principle there I admit that it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to remedy the
greviance: but where the case is only new in the instance,
.ALTD T}i-

OLY QUESTIO% IS UP0U THE APPLICATION of a principle

recognized in the law to such new case, it will be just as
competent to courts of juStice to apply

the principle to any

which may arise two centuries hence as it was two centuries
ago: If it were not, we ought to blot out of our law books
one fourth part of the cases that are to be found in them
Is Government by Injunction new iii the Principle or only in
the instance?

If new in the principle it is unjustifiable,

If only new in the instance it is justifiable, as 'it is the
function of the courts to apply established principles to kk
the changing circumstances and conditions of h',uman life"
The general objection is always interposed in these
cases that "it is not one of the functions of a court of
equity to prevent the commission of threatened crimes.'

It

seems that in early times "the Lord Chancellor assumed juris
diction in some cases upon the ground that the defendant's
power was such that he could not or would not be punished by

a court of law for committing a threatened offense"
this paactice has long been obsolete.
684 et seq.

4.
But

1 Spence, 343-345,

(See The Mayor V. Jacques, 30 Ga. 506, 513.)

In Gee V. Pritchard, 2 Swanston, 402, 413, Lord Eldon said:
"The publication of a libel is a crime, and I have no juris
diction to prevent the commission of a crime"

bUT W1HVLE

-

THIS IS TRUE IT IS EQUALLY AS TRUE THAT $T}HE MERN FACT THAT
an act is criminal does not divest the

"xxk

jurisdiction of

equity to prevent it by injunction, if it be also a violation of property rights, and the party aggreived has no
other adequate remedy for the prevention of the irreparable
injury which will result from the failure or inability of a
court of law to redress such right"
•84 Ala., 115, 126.

Peoples gas Co. V. Tyner,131 Ind. 277.

Minke V. Hopeman, 87 Ill. 451.
N. Y. 341.

Mobile V. Ry Co.,

Crawford V. Tyrrell, 128

Shoe Co. V. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212.

In the last

case at page 220 the court says,"It will be observed that
the defendants do not claim the right to do what the injunction forbids them doing; .their learned counsel ever quotes ik
the statute to show that it is a crime to do so; but he contends that ithe constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the State of Mosouri guarantee them the
right to committ crime with only ithis limi t ation, to wit:
that they shall answer for the crime when committed, in a
criminal court before a jury; and that to restrain them from
committing crime is to rob them of their cbnbtitutional
right of trial by jury.

5.
"If

that position be correct,

valid statute to prevent crime.
trary to all reason.

then there can be no

But that position is con-

The right of trial by jury does not

arise until the party is accused of having already committed
the crime.

If you see a man advancing upon another with

murderous demeanor and a deadly weapon, and you arrest him,
disarm him, you) have iperhaps prevented an act which would
have brought

about a trial by jury, but can you, be said to

have deprived him of hhe constitutional right of trial by
jury?

The train of thought put in motion by the argument

of the learned counsel for the p±xa~idft defendants on this
point leads only to this end, to wit, that the constitution
guarantees to every man the right to commit crime so that he
may enjoy fhe inestimable right of trial by jury.

# #

#

When we say that a court of equity will never intefere by
injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, we mean t1
that it will not do so simply for the purpose of preventing
a violation of a criminal law.

But when the act complainthe
ed of threatens an irreparable injury to"property of an individual, a court of equity will interfere to prevent that
injury, notwithstanding the act may also be a violation of
a criminal law.

In such case the court does not interfere

to prevent the commission of a crime although that may incidentally result, but it exerts its force to protect the
individuals property from destruction, and ignores entirely
the criminal portio- of the act.'
In Carlton V. Rugg,

149 Mass. 550,553, it is said,

"The fallacy of the argument lies in part in disregarding

"t

Eis~'"
a _34e

--_
i E ,_b44 ;Q

the distinction between a 'proceeding to abate a nuisance,
which looks only to the property, that in the use made of it
constitutes a nuisance, and a proceeding to :punish an offend.
er for the crime of maintaining a nuisance.
proceedings are antirely unlike.

These two

The latter is conducted

under the provisions of the criminal law, and deals only
with the person who has violated the law.

The former is

governed by the rules which relate to property, and its only
connection with persons is through property in which they
may be interested"

17.
Labor troubles seem to divide naturally into two classes:)
strikes and boycotts.

7e will first deal with the use of

the injunction in strike cases.

The definitions of a

strike range from "a cessation of work, as of workmen, in
order to extort higher wages? (Worcester) to the elaborate
tirade of JUdge Jenkins in Farmer's &c. Co. V. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co.,

He says,

60 Fed. 803, pp. 818-822.

"It has well

been said that the wit of man could not devise a legal
strike, because compulsion is the leading idea of it.

A

strike is essentially A constiracy to extort by violence;
be
the means employed to effect the end kxxing riot only the

t-

conspirators, but the

cessation of labor by the x, m±:krxx

necessary prevention of labor by those willing to assume
th eir places, and, as a last resort, and in many instances
an essential element of success, the disabling and destruction of the property of the master; and so, by intimidation
and by the compulsion of force, to accomplish the end design
ed.

I know of k

peaceable sttike.

I think no strike

was ever heard of that was or could be successful unaccompanied by intimidation and violente"

"Of the ideal strike

the only criticism to be indulged is that it is ideal,
and never existed in fact!

Notwithstanding JUdge Jenkins

it is well settled "that strikes are not necessarily illegal
Arthur V. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 327.
Ass'n. V. Walsh, 2 dalyl.
ell, 26 Ore.? 527.

Master Stevedore's

Lnngshore Printing Co. V. How-

"We are not perpared"I said JUdge

Harlan in A-thur V. OaRes, "in the absence of evidence, to
hold, as matter of law, that a combihation among employes,
having for its object their orderly withdrawal in large num-

8.
bers, or in a body from the service of their employers, on
account

simply of a rediction in

*heir wages,

is

not a xtrx

strike, within the meaning of the word a. commonlV used.
Such a withdrawal although amounting to a strike, is

pot, as

we have already said, either illegal or criminal"
The "legality

or illegality of a strike "must depend

on the means byi which it is enforced, and on its objects"
Suppose a

This brings us to the first question.

strike to be illegal, can the body of men be enjoined from 4
striking?

In Farmer's &c. Co. V. Ry. Co.,

ployes of the railroad were enjoined

"from

supra, the em(1) combining and

conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the service of
said receivers,5with the object and intent of crippling the
property in their custody, or ambarras the operation of sai&
railroad, and (2) from so quitting the service of the said
receivers, withs
lxrzpux~

xmk$HEtxacxxtmim

or without notice,

nfxzxxi±±!x±NX~kxxxx

as to cripple the property,

prevent or hinder the operation of said railroad!.
second point the court said,

or

On the

( p. 812) "None will dispuie

the general proposition of the right (f every one to choose
his employer, andi to determine the times and conditions of
service, or his right to abandon such service,- to use the
expressio", of Judge Pardee in Re Higgins,

(27 Fed.,

4$3)7-

'peacebly and decently'-but it does not follow that one has
the absolute right to abandon a service which he has undertaken, without regard to time and conditions.

It is ab-

surd to say that one may do ache will withoiit respect to the
rights of others.

Liberty and license must

not be con-

founded.

Liberty is not the exercise of unbridled will,

but consists in freedom of action, having due regard to the
some
There would seem to exist in :kk minds
rights of others.
a lamentable misapprehension of the terms 'liberty' and
'right!

It would seem by some to be supposed

that in this

land one has the constitutional right to do as one may pleae
and that any restraint iupon the will is an infringement xpz
upon freedon of action.
relative.
duty.

Rights are not absolute, but are

Rights grow out of duty9 and are limited by
One has not the right arbitrarily to quit service

without regard to the necessities of that service.
right of abandonment is

His

limited by the assiihption of that

service, and the conditions and exigencies attaching thereto,
.

It cannot be conceded that an individual has the

legal right to abandon service whenever he may please.

His

right to leave is dependant upon duty7, and his duty is dictated and measured by theexigencyJ of the occassion....
It is said that to -estrain them from so doing is abridgement of liberty and infringement of constitutional right.
do not so apprehend the law.

I

I freely concede the right of

the individual to abandon service at a proper time, and in a
decent m;inner;, but I do not concede their right to abandon
such service suddenly and without reasonable notice"
On appeal (rthur V. Oakes) the injunction was modified by striking out the second clause, Judge Harlan saying,
"The vital question remains whether a court of equity will
under any circumstances, by injunction, prevent one individpersonal
ual from q+itting the"service of another?
.
The rulq

10.
we think, is without exception that equity will 'iot compdl
the actual, affirmative performance by an employe of merely
personal services, any more than it will compel an employer
to -etain in his personal service one who, no matter for
what cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that
characte,-.

The right of an employe engaged to perform

personal servibce to quit that service rests upon the same
basis as the right of his emplojer to discharge him from
If the quitting in the one case or the

personal service.

discharging in the other is in violation of the contract between the parties, the one injured by the breach has his
action for damages; and a court of equity,

indire-ctl' or

negatively, by means of 1n injulctton, restraining the
violation

of the contvact, compel the affirmative perform-

ance from day to day or the affirmative acceptance of merely
personal services.

Relief of that character has always

been regarded as impracticable.
Penn. Co.,
Fr,

54 Fed.,

740 Taft? J.? and authorities cited;

ppec. Perf. (3d Am. Ed.)

cited.

...

Toledo &c. Fy. Co. V.

secs. 87-81, and authorities

The fact that employes of railroads may

quit under circumstances that would show bad faith upon
their part, or a reckless disregard of their contractx or of
the convenience and interests of the public, does not justify a departure from the general rule that equity will not
compel the actual, affirmative performance of merely personal services, or (which is the same thing) require employes,
against their will, to remain in the personal service of
their employerV

11.
It is now settled that employes have a right to quit
"whenever thej may see fit to do so, and no one can pceventh
them"

Shoe Co. V. Saxey, supra.

(Pa.) 324.

Cook V. Dolan, 6 dist.

U. S. V. Debs, 64 Fed. p. 763.

But it has been held that "so long as they (employes)
remain in the einployment of the complainant company" the
court will compal then"to~prform all their regular and
accustomed dlties" where "such refusal (to perform duties)
subjects and w~ll continue to subject the complainant to a
multiplicity ,of suits and to great and irreparable damage'
So. Cal. Ry. Co. V. Putherford, 62 Fed. 796.

See

(dicta) Chicago &c. Ry. Co, V. Bur1ington &c. Ry. Co.,
Fed/, 481 ,483.

34

In Re Lennon , 54 Fed. 746; 150 U. S.J393;

4 Fed. 320; 166 U. S. 548.

"But since the company has

the, power of discharge, equity would not interfere b-1 injunction, except in a clear case of special necessity.'

(34 Fed)

On the first proposition of the portion of the injunation quoted fron Farmer's &c. Co/V. Ry. Co.,

Judge

Harlan, in Arthur V. Oakes, said: "But different considerations must control infrespect to the words in the same paragraph of the writs of injunction, 'and from snrbinng and
conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the service of
said receivers,,with the object and intent of crippling the
property in their custody, or embarrassing the operation of
said railroad';..

.

We have said that if employes were unwill-

ing to remain in the service of the receivers for the compensation prescribed for them by the railroad schedules, it
was the right of eachlone oA that account to withdraw from'
such s!.rvice.

It wa.; equally their right without refer-

12.
ence to the effect upon the property or upon +he operation
of the xz±±road, to confer with each other upon the subject
of the proposed reducation in wages, and withdraw in a body
from 'he services of the receivers because of the proposed
change.

Indeed, their right, as a body of employes af-

fected by the proposed reduction

of wages, to demand given

rates of compensation as a condition of their remaining

in

b

the service, was as absolute and perfect as was the right of
the receivers representing the aggregation of persons, creditors and stockholders, interested in the trust property,
and the general public, to fix the rates they were willing
to

cray

their respective employes.

But that is a very

different matter from a combination and conspiracy

among

employes, with the object and intent, not simply of quitting
the service of the receivers because of the reduction of
wages, but of crippling the pro~perty in their hands, and
rail
embarrassin the qperation of the"road.
When the order for
the original injunction was applied for it was representedand the interveners admit by their motion that it was correctly represented- that unless the restraining power of
the court was exerted the dissatisfied employees, and others
co-operating with them, would physically disable and render
unfit for xxxxKH use the cars and other property of the
receivers, and by force, threats and intimidation used against employes remaining in their service, and against those
desiring to take the

.lace of those quitting, would prevent

the receivers from operating the road in their custody, and
and from discharging the duties which they owed on behalf of

13.
the corporation to the parties inte,'ested, in the trust
propeety, to the government and to the public.
"The general inhibition against combinations and conspiracies formed with the object and in4 ent of crippling the
property and embarrassing the operation of the railroad must
be construed as referring only to acts of violence, intinidation and wrong of the same nature or class as those specifically described in the previous clauses

(of) the writ.

We do not interpret the words last above quoted as embracing
the case of akK employes who, being dissatisfied with the
proposed reduction of wages,

merely withdraw on that account

singly or by concerted action, from the service of the receivers, using neither force, threats, persecution, nor intimidation towards employes who do not join them, norfny
device to molest, hinder, alarm, or interfere with others
who take or desire to take their places.
"Ireems entirel,1 clear,

...

upon authority,

that any com-

bination or conspiracy upon the part of these employes would
be illegal, which has for its object to cripple the property
in the hands of the receivers, and to embarrass the operati,
of the railroads under their management, either by disabling
or rendering unfit for use engines, cars, or other property
in their hands, or by interfering with their possession, or
by actually obstructing their control and management of the
property, or by using force, intimidation, threats, or other
wrongful methods against the receivers or their agents, or
against employes remaining in their service, or by ising
like methods to cause employes to quit or prevent or deter

14.
others from entering the service in place of those leaving
it/

Combinations of that character disturb the peace of

society, and are mischevious in the extrme.

They imperil

the interests of the 1,ublic, which may rightfully, demand
that the free course of trade shall not be unreasonably obstructed.

They endanger the personal security and the

personal liberty of individuals who, in the exercise of the
inalienable privelege of choosing the terms upon which they
shall labor, enter or attempt to enter the service of those
against whom combinations are specially aimed.

And as

acts of the character referred to would have defeated a proper administration of the trust estate, and inflicted irreparable inju;ry upon it, as well as prejudiced the rights of
the public, the circuitproperly framed its injunction so
as to restrain all such acts as are specifically mentioned,
as well as combinations and conspiracies havibg the object
and intent of physically injuring the property, or actually
interfering with the regular, continuous operation of the
railroad by the receivers"
This case was followed in Elder V. Whitsides, M2 Fed,
724.

See Thomas V. Cincinatta &c. Ry.
In U. S. V. Debs, 64 Fed.,

-o.,

62 Fed. p/ 817

724, 763, Judge Woods,

commenting on Arthur V. Oakes, said, "Neither expressly nor
by implication does the opinion there delivered lend the remotest sanction to the proposition asserted by one of the e-u
counsel for the defendants, that in free America every mah
has a right to abandon his position either for a good or a
bad reason, and that another, for a good or a bad reason,

15.
may advise or persuade him to do so.
Uot true

.

...

Manifestly this is

The right of men to strike peaceably, and

the right to advise a peaceable strike, which the law does
not assume to be impossible, is not questioned.

But if

men enter into a conspiracy to do an unlawfiil thing, and, in
order to accomplish their purpose, advise workmen to go upon
a strike, knowing that violence and wrong will be the probable outcome, neither in law nor in morals can they escape
responsibility'.'
If employes cannot be restrained from striking what
is the province of equity in case of a strike?

The rule

is well stated in Cook V. Dolan?- "A court of equity has no
jurisdiction over the question which caused the strike.
It cannot stop the conflict; it can only see that the conflict which is being waged, is confined within what are recognized as lawful limits.

It were better there were no

strikes, and stilt better that there were no just cause for
them.

But the cou-ts can neither stop the strikes nor en-

force the demands of the strikess.

We can only say to the

parties to the controversy, thus far and no further can you
go without violating the rights of the public or the personal rights of individuals"

What are lawful limits we

will now discuss.
It seems to be conce-eded that strikers "have a right
to use fair persuasion to induce others to join them in
their quitting or refrain from taking their places"
Co. V. Saxey.

Shoe

)vf Ry. Co. V. Wenger, 17 Wk. L. Bull.? 306.

Rogers V. Evarts, 17 N. Y. suppl.

.

16.
But strikers have no right to stop new workmen,
against their will, while on their way to work, for the purpose of arguing with them.

O'Neil V. Behhnna, 182 Pa. St.

"It
6 is frther urgedV says Justice Mitchell)t "that
the strikers through their committees only exercised ( 'iNsisted on' is the phrase their counsel use in court)t their
right to talk to the mew men, to persuade them not to go to
work.

There was no such right.

These men were there

presumably under contract with the plaintiff, and certainly
in search of work if not yet actu]ally under pay.

They

4were not at leisilre, and their time, whether their own or
their employers, could not lawfully be taken up and their
progress interrupted With by +hese or any other outsiders on
any pretense or under any claim of right, to argue or persuade them to break their contracts.

Even, therefore, i4f

if the arguments and persuasions had been confined to lawful
Mans, they were exerted at an improper time, and were an
interference with the plaintiffVs rights which made the perpetrators liable for any damage the plaintiff suffered in
consequence"
"Bvt when fair persvasion is exhausted they have no
right to resort to force or threats of violence"

"The law

will protect their freedom and their rights, but it will not
permit them tolestroy the freedom and rights of others.

The

same law which guarantees the defendants in their rightx to
quit the employment of the plaintiffs at their own will and
pleasure also 1uarantees the otherx employes the right to
remain at their will and pleasure.

Shoe Co. Vo. Saxey.

17.
The earliest case I have been able to find is Muller
V. cGrantz.

(See, appendix.)

In this case an ex patte

order was granted by Judge Donohue restraining the defendant
from using both Dpersuasions and threatz" against employes
and those who wished to become employes of the plaintiff.
On notion to contine Ihe injunction, Judge Barrett modified
the order by directing that it "be confined to intimidationa

The next case is Brusche V. The Furnitulre Maker's Union, 18
Chicago Legal News, 306.

I quote the following from the

opinion of Judge Collirs, "The bill then alleges that complainant refused to comply with these demands, and in consequence of such refisalhave attempted and are now a"temting
in an unlawful manner to ri-le or ruin his business, and to
prevent.,other workmen from being employed by him; that the
defendants threaten to blow up complainants factory with
dynamite; that 1hey sAand on the side walk of his factory
and on the side walks leading khximt

to it, continuously

occupying it and making threa+s against him and his buisnesq
that they prevent by force workmen who wre employed and those
who desire employment from entering his factory; that they
have placed a guard over his factory and over the streets
leading to it, and that said streets are patrolled constantly b' the defendants and others by their procurement for the
unlawful purpose of intimidating complainant's workmen and
thus preventing them from entering his factory, and such
workmen are subjected to personal violence and insult by
the defendants while going to and coming from their work at

18/
complainant's factory, and that the defendants threaten if
their demands are not complied with they will continue the
same system of annoyance and will continue to destroy complainant's factory and all the stock and machinery therein!
. .

"An injunction was issued to restrain the defendants

.

from committing the acts complained of"
In McCandless V. O'Brien, 21 Pitts. L. J.,
court said,

"It

435, the

be ujnderstood that plaintiff's

must still

are here entitled to an injunction . . .

because they (de-

fendants) have undertaken by woords and acts, by, their numbers, their manner, and their movements, not to persuade
workmen to look at the matter of working for plaintiffs as
they view it, and of their own free will cease; but *o
practically compel them by annoyance and intimidation to
It is now

leave plaintiffs employ or refuse employmeijt"

well settled, following the doctrine of these early cases,
that an injunctior, will be granted restraining strikers from
using force, threats, intimidations arid coercion against
other persons who remain in the elployment of the complainant or who seek employment from him.
91 Hun, 489.

Davis V. Zimmermen,

Coeur D'Alene &c. V. Miner's Union, 51 Fed.?

Murdock V. Walker, 152 Pa. ST.? 595.

260.

V. Brown, 164 Pa. St.,

Wick China CO.

Mxrxay Steel Wire Co. V.

449.

But where no force, violence,

Murray, 80 Fed., 811.

intimidation or coercion is intended against such workmen
Johnson Harvester Co.

an injunction will be refused.
V. Meinhardt, 9 Ab. N. C.,
17 N.

Y. Suppl.? 261,

67 Hun,

294,

aff'd.,

and 144 N.

393, aff'd. 24 Hun, 489.
sub.

Y.? 189.

nomrRenolds V.

Roge-s.
Everett,

19.
In Murdock V. Walker, an injunction was granted restraining defendants

"from gathering at and about plaintiffs

place of 'business, and from following the workmen employed
by plaintiffs, or who may hereafter be so employed, to and
from their work, and gathering at and about the boarding
places of said workmen, and from any and all maner of threat
menaces, intimidationx, opprobrius epithets, ridicule and
anan

to and against said workman or any of them them, f

for or on account of their working for plaintiffs."

(See,

also, China Co. V. Brown and Cook V. DolaA.)
In Veglehan V. Guntner, 167 Mass.,

92? the injunction

included "social pressure" used in connection with threats
and ti:Rkup:Ux intimidation and persuasion to break existing contracts.
Pa. St.,

-2

(See quotation from Cote V. Murphy, 159
, on p.

Y,

I

In Sweeny V. Torrence, I Dist. (Pa.)

622, the injunc-

tion was refused because "all the acts complained of that
are distinct and particular occurred or were committed long
since

.

...

It seems that on behalf of these plaintiffs

this court is not asked to stop or prohibit the commission
or consumation of any present or threatening action by the
defendants, but to anticipate and prohibit by its injunctio4
some action that may possibly be taken in the future.

When

such action is taken it will be time to interfere"
In Mayer V. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n.,
Eq.,

47 N. J.

519, an injunction was denied because "nothing has been

proved in this case to warrant a findinghat the defendants
have done or threatened

i

that is not legalized by this

(Act of 1883, Rev. Sup. p. 774,

act of the legislature.
sec. 30.)

.

.

They have agreed not to work with any

.

but members of their association, and not to work for any
employer who insists on their doing so, by withdrawing
So long as they confine themselves

from his employment.

to peaceable means to affect these ends, they are within
the letter and spirit of the law, and not subject to the
interference

of the courts.'

But what constitutes force, threats and intimidation?
In

McCandless V.

O'Brien the court said,

"It

ciently appears that the defendants . .

still

suffi-

were not satis-

fied with such means as left such workmen to choose freely
between working and refraining from work, but undertook to
so act as to make it unpleasant and apparently to some deg
gree unsafe for them to continue in plaintiff's employmHxkx,
and to embarrass them by preventing them from obtaining
suitable lodgingz or boarding places,

and thus force those

who were desirous of working to quit plaintiff's employ.'
In 0'Neil V. Behanna it is said, "The strikers and their
counsel seem to think that the former could do anything to
attain their ends, short of actual, physical violence.
is a most serious mistake.

This

The 'arguments' and 'persua-

sions' and 'appeals' of a hostile and demonstrative mob have
a potency over men of ordinary nerve which far exceeds the
limits of lawfulness.

The display of force though none is

actually used is intimidation, and as much unlawful as violence itself'
he court said,

In Mackall V. Ratchford, 82 Fed.,
"It

seems from the evidence

41,42,

that but few of

21.
the miners employed at the Montana mines had joined the
strikers.

All efforts to induce them to do so had apparAt this Jijncture a company of marching

ently failed.

strikers, mostly from Monongah7 went into camp about one
mile from the Montana mines.

During Honday, Tuesday and

Wednesday, this company, under command of its offic-ers, with
music and banners, marched and nountermarched along the
county road running fhvmugh the property of the Montana Coal
& Coke Company.

This marching was very early in the morn-

ing and in the afternoon, at times when the miners of said
company, were either going to or coming from their work.
The marching was. from thQ camp down to the mine opening,
then back to the village where the miners lived, thence
again past the mine openiag,

and so on,

'To

and fro',

certain hours of the morning and afternoon....

during
A body

of men, over 200 strong, marching in the early hours of the
morning, before daylight, halting in front of the mine opening, and taking position ofi each sideoft the public highway
for a distance of at least a quarter of a mile, at the exact
places where the miners were in the habit of crossing that
highway for the purpose of going from their homes to their
work, is at least unusual, and in the state of excitement
usuall:
argument,

attending such occassions, neither an aid to fair
no'

conducive,,, to the state of mind that makes xtii

willing converts to the cause thus championed.

That the

marching did intimidate quite a number of the miners is
clear, if the evidence offered is to be believed; and the
court finds it uncontradicted and entitled to credence.

22.
The court is also forced to conclude, from the facts and
circuimstance detailed by the witnesses, from the object the
marching men had in view, and from the locality where they
marched, and its topography, that the intention of the march.
ing strikers was to interfere with the operation of the
Montana mines,-with the miners engaged in working said mine§
to intimidate them, and tlereby induce them to abandon their
work, and then secure their co-operation in closing the
mines.

The marching men seemed to think that they could

go and come on and over the county road as they pleased, becuase it was a public highway.

But this was a mistake.

The miners working at Montana had the same right to use the
rublic road as the strikers had, and it was not open and
free to their use when it was occupied by over 200 men
stationed along it at intervals of three or five feet,men who, if not open enemies, were not bosom friends.
some miners passed through this line is shown.
others feared to do so is plain.

That

That uik

That the marching col-

umn intended to interfere with the work at the mines would
be foolish to denyU

In Cook V. Dolan the defendants

"with the permission of Joseph Arnold established a"camp on
his farm within one-half mile of the plaintiff's pit mouth'
Of the conduct of the campers, the court saysi "Did the

ftfx

defendants and those who were acting with them cross the
line which divides a lawful find an unlawful assembly and
the line which divides legitimate persuasion and uklawful
coercion in the manner in which they conducted their camp?

23.
We think they kxxz did....

It certainly cannot be

claimed that calling a working miner a 'scab'

a 'blackleg',

a 'black sheep', a 'blackleg s- b-.' and threatening him
if

he did not come out now that armed men would be sent for,

and threatening that personal violence, 'knocking off his
ears,?' would '.e resorted if he went to work, is legiti~iate
persuasion.

Such language is clearly intei;ded to coerce a

and not persuade.

Three or four hundred men

...

tramway and close to their

marching under the plaintiff's

pit-mouth and miners' houses, all armed with a walking sticx
singing 0We'll hang blacklegs on a sour apple tree?' in view
of the ipprobriols epithets to which we have referred, and
a frequent repktition of 'his marching,

was evidently calcul.-

ted, if not in~ended, to impress fear on those miners who
desired and were working, rather than to conciliate and win
them to the strikers' way of thinking.

And more than thA.

it was a trespass on the plaiintiffs' land, which had been
forbidden.

For the last ten days the little

village or cluster of miners'

houses near the pit-mouth of

the plaintiffs' mine has been patrolled bi

every night, and

at almost all hours of the night, by squads consisting of
from ten to fifteen men.

And miners who desired to work

and who went to work before daylight were intercepteik by
these squads; and the men composing these squads during the
night talked in front of and near miners' houses, using language which showed a decided hostility on their part +o
those mdners who worked and whose families lived in these
houses.

Such a course of conduct on the part of campers

has the featvreg,

of the conduct of a military

camp in a

24.
time of war, and is sugestive of a campaig., of force and not
legitimate persuasion.

Such conduct could not help in-

spiring fear on the part of those acting in opposition to
the wishes of the strikers, and the testimony shows

,at

it

has done so, and that some of the plaintiffs' miners have
been forced to quit by the fear thus inspired"
In Rogers V. Evarts, Judge 8grith said? "There may be
cases, however, wheve -persuasion and entreaty are not lawful
instruments to effect the purpose of a strike.

Even per-

suasion and entreaty ma- be used in such a manner, with such
persistency, and with such environments as to constitute
intimidation.
S.

Their use then becomes a violation of law.

In People V. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Cr. R.,

434, Justice

Barrett says: 'The mere fact that no violence was used in
the streets is not conclusive.

It is for you

(the jory)

to say whether the attitude of these men was threatening.
Nor is it necessary that there should have been a direct
threat.

If you

believe that the attitude actually pre-

sented by the distributors of these circulars was an attitude of intimidation, either to the passervby or to the
womnan inside, considering all the circumstances, then all
who participated in it, directly or indirectly, are within
the meaning of that Word 'intimidation'?, as uised in
conspiracy act.'

+he

It stands conceded by defendants coon-

sel that the strikers have not the right to assemble in
front of a factory in such numbers as to constitute intimidation.

Picketing may be done in such numbers as to con-

stitute intimidation.

Jebring and shouting at employes

may constitute intimidation.

Persuasion or entreaty may

2E5.
Whereverk

be so persistent as to constitute intimidation.

the strikers assume towards the employes an attitd&
,.

,

,

&di

sitreaty;

Z

with words however

smooth, may constitute intimidation, which will render those
who use them liable to the penalties of both the civil and
It may be impossible to lay down

criminal law. ....

a general rule as to wha$ surroundin,:- circumstances will
Each

characterize persuasion and entreat, as intimidation.
case must probably depend on its own surroundings.

But

where the evidence presents such a case as to convince the
court that the emplofes are being induced to leave
their fears rather than

plo,er by operating up_

Jdgment or their sympathy,

the em-

,pon their

the court will be quick to lend

ist strong arm to its protection.

Rights guaranteed by

law will be enforced by the courts, whether invoked by employer or emplo--,e
In TU.

S. V. Kane, 23 Fed.,

justice Brewer illuistrated 'he

748, the present Mr,/

proposition by this figre?

"Supposing Mr. W. had two men employed, and that he finds
that in the management of his little farm he is not making
enough so that he"'can afford to
he says to one bf them:

5 employ

two labore'rs, and

'Iwill have to get along without

your services, and Iwill do with 'he services of the other?'
and the one leaves.
one who
him:

That is all right.

Supposing the

leaves goes to the one wh-o has not left and says to

'Now, look here; leave with me,' givf.n7 whatever rea-

sons he sees fit, whatever reasons he can adduce,- and the
other one says,

'Well I will leave?' and he leaves because

26.
his co-laborer has persuaded him to leave;

that is all right,

Mr. Wheeler has nothing to say; he may think that

the rea-

sons that the one that is leaving has given to the one that
he would like to have itay are frivolous, not such as oughtt
to induce him to leave, but that is those gentlemen's busiIf the one whom he would like to have stay is in-

ness.

clined to go because his friend has urged, has persuaded
him, has induced him to leave, Mr. W.
That

is the right of both these man,-

tions, give reasons, and

cannot say anything.
the one to make sugges-

the other to listen to them, and

act upon them.
"But supposing - and I will take the illustration I
partially suggested yesterday - supposing one is discharged
and the other wants to stay,
and the one

that

is satisfied withthe

employment,-

'eaves goes atoind to a number of friends

a-ld gat,,ers +hem, and they come around, a large

body of ther;,

as T suggested yesterday, a party with revolvers and muskets
and the one that

leaves comes to the

one that wants to

stay and says to him, 'Now, my friends are here, you had
better leave:
party that

I request you to leave;'

the man looks at the

is standing there; there is nothing but a simple
is so far as the lang-oage which is used;

request:-

that

there is

no threat;

but it is a -equest backed by a demon-

stration of force, a demonstration intended to intimidate,
calculated to intimidate, and the man says:

'Well I would

like to stay, I am willing to work here, yet there are to
many men here, there is to mrnuoh of a demonstration;
afraid to stay.'

I am

Now, the comrmoi; sense of every man teLls

27.
h

him that this is not a mere request,- tells him that while
the language used may be very polite and be merely in the
form of a request, yet it is accompanied with that backing
of force intended as a demonstration and calculated to make
an impression; and that the man leaves really because he
is intimidated.
"If I take another illustration, Iill make it even
more plain.

Supposing half a dozen men stop a coach, with

revolvers in their hands, and one man askts the passengers
politely to step out and pass over their valuables; and supposing those man should be put on trial before any court for
robYpry, would not you despise a judge who would say,-

'why

there was no violence; there wero no threats; there was
simply a request to these passengers to hand over their
valuables, and they handed them over;
quest and a loan of their valuables!

it was simply a reWould not the common

sense of every man say that that request, no matter how
politely it was expressed, was a request backedA a demonstration of force that was really "M,,, 'ifrr, an
offense rob1 ery?
that?

made the

Would not you expect any judge to say

Would not you despise any one who would say othert.

wise?
In Allen

V.

1''

Flood Lord Hershell said, "In another

passage in his opinion the learned judge

(Hawkins) says that

there is no authority for the proposition that to render
threatsp menaces, intimidation or coercion available as
elements in a cause of action, they must be oC such a character as to create fear of personal violence.

I quite

28.
The threat of violence to property is

agree with this.

equally a threat in the eye of the law.'
It will thus be seen that intimidation "is the effect
of such things, said or done, or threat made, as reasonably
put one in fear, -und control his freedom of action, or thus
corn pel one to act out the will of another instead of his
own will'.'

Parker V. Bricklayer's Tunion, 21 Wk. L. B.225.

The grounds for equitable interference in these cases
have been variously staled but it
founded on the

is

generally

said to be

irreparable n ature of the injury,

the restraining a nuisance,

tion of a multiplicity of suits,

In

and the p-otection of property.
Makers Union it was said,

the preven-

Brusche V.

Furniture

"It is contended that such acts

of defendants as are properly alleged constitute offenses
punishable as crimes, and that a court of equity will not
enjoin the commission of a crime, and that the civil remedy
by an action for damages is

full,

adequate and complete.

On the other hand the complainant contends that although the
defendants are liable to indictment yet their action and
threatened movements are such an invasio, of property rights
as require -the preventive process of injunction, arid

,

hat

without such process a continuing and irreparable injury
will be wrought,
law.

for which there is

no adequate mxremedy at

The latter contention seems 11o be well founded.

;'

In a bill like this presenting a case of manifest merit and
great wrong to the complainant,
for technicalities

the court will not search..

or fine spun theories upon which to

support a refusal of relief

but will follow the well settled

29.
rules which are well stated in the case of Parker V. 'Vinnipiseogee Co.,

2 Black, 454, where the court says:

'A court

of equity will interfere where the injury by the ,v7rorigful
act of the adverse party will be irreparable, as where the
loss of health, the loss of trade, the destruictibn of the
means of subsistance, or the ruin of property must ensue.
. . .

It will also give its aid to irevent oppresive and

interminable

ilitigation or a multiplicit,/ of suits;

where the injury is

of such a nature that it

equal-ely compensated

by damages at law,

cannot

or is

or
be ad-

such as from

its continuance or permanent mischdef must occasion a constantly recurring greviance, which cannot be prevented other
wise 'han by injunstion'
In McCandless V. O'Brien the court said that defendants were "guilty of acts which constitute a nuisance"
Speaking of its power to restrain a nuisance the court said,
"Even if the expression 'rights of individuals',

in the act

of 1836, means only -'ights of property which can be handled
and technically trespassed upon.

The court has jiurisdic-

tion to enjoin a continuing trespass, but its jiurisdiction
is

not limited to such cases.

Without

touching the prop-

erty of plaintiffs, defendants may commit acts which constitute a nuisance and infringe upon rights of property.
principle which in

such cases justify and require the inter-

ference of a court of equity, are closely allied to if
identical with, those applicable to tresspass.
there isc

The

not

In trespass

direct infringement of one's right of property-

in nuisance it is consepuential.

In either case equity

30.

will afford relief by injunction, if the injury be such as
is not susceptible of adequate pecuniary compassation in
damages, or one the continuance of which would be a constant
ly recurring greivance"
In Blindell V. Hagan, 54 Fed.,

40, the court says,

"Where there is a large comiination of persons to interfere
with a parties business by violence, the equitable ju-isdiction, if maintainable at all, is maintainable on either
of two grounds,-

the nature of the injury, including the di

ficulty of establishing in a suit at law the amount of actual damage suffered, or the prevention of a multiplicity
of suits.

The jurisdiction fot these reasons, was main-

tained in the following cases: Emack V. g

, 34 Fed.,

Casey V. Typographical Union, 45 Fed., 135, 144. ,
V. pickle, 4 Sandf.,Ch., 381?
Perkins, 147 Mass., 212"

(marg. P. 357.)
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Gilbert

Sherry V.

P i c k e t i n g.

ho

Picketing by strikers is placing a patrol of men at
or near the place of business of the complainant to watch
such place for the purpose of ascertaining the mamnLx of

the employes, and customers, in order, that the strikers may
persuade them to cease working for or trading with the complainant.

Is picketing unlawful?

In Perkins V. 1ogg

I

28 Wk. L. Bull.,

32, 35, Smith J.1, said,

"The system of

sending a committee to the neighborhood of a factory, as was
done in this aase, is one that has frequently been adopted
before in

case of strikes, and may be legal or illegal ac-

cording as it

is

in interference

labor as I have defined it"

or

not,

with the right of

-The definition is as follows,

"The right which the striking workmen claims for- himself,
and to which he is justly entitled, viz. toA

he pleases

and to ask for his work such wages as he shall deem proper,
is also a right which he must accord to ever' ofher workman
in the community; and while the law permits him to endeavor,
by reasonable a"gument, and persuasion, to induce another to
adopt his views and to cease work and to join him in his
demand for higher wages; yet he has no right by threats,
intimidation or molestation, or b-' any form of coersion or
compulsion to interfere with
of a fellow workman.

the exercise of the free will

Such interference is an invasion of

'he right of free labor, for which the striking workman is
himself contending"
In Veglehan V. Gluntner a patrol of Amen

was maintained

in front of the plaintiff's factory from half past six in

32.
the morning till half past five in the afternoon.

"The

number of men was greater at +imes, and at times showed some
little disposition to stop the plaintiff's door7

"The

patrol was maintained as one of the means of carrying out
the defendants' plan, and it was used in combination with
social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful
harm, and persuasion to break existing contracts.

It was

thus one means of intimidation indirectly to the plaintiff
and directly to persons actually emploed, or seeking to be
employed, by the plainti'f, and of rendering such employmerit intolerable to such persons.

Such an act is an un-

lawful interference with the rights both of employer and of
employedV

"No one can lawfully interfere by force or in(

timidation to prevent employers or persons employed or wishing to be employed from the exercise of these rights....
Intimidation is not limited

to threats of viblence or of

physical injury to person or property.

It has a broader

signification, and there ma also may be a moral intimidation
which is illegal.

Patrolling or picketing, under the

circumstances stated in the report, has elements of intimidation like those which were found to exist in Sherry V/
Perkins, 147 Mass.,
See Rogers V

2121.
.

Evarts, 17 N

case on appeal in 67 Hun,
10 Cox Cr. Cases, 592,601.
mases, 325, 327.

Y. Supp.,

294, at p. 299.

264 and same
Reg. v. Druitt

Reg. v. Sheppard, 11 Cox Cr.

Reg. v. Hilbert, 13 Cox Cr. Casts,82.

For an interesting case on picketing and the effect of the k
later Englisk Statutes see, Lyons v. Wilkins, 1896,1 CH.,311

33.

C i r c u 1 a r s.
It is generally and correctly stated that equity xiii
has no jurisdiction to restrain a libel.
Fed., 773 and cases cited.

Kid v. Iforry, 26

But the fact still remainA

that equity has granted injunctions restraining the distributions of circulars, posters, &c. in many cases,

If they

were not restrained as being libelous, why was relief granted?

The earliest case rearing on the subject is

Gilbort

In this case the complainant was an auction-

v. Mickle,

eer, lawfully entitled to do and doing business in New York
City.

The defendant (mayor of the city),- "complaints

having been repeatedly made to him against the establishment of the Oaixki±

complainant,

as being a mock auction-

eur"- Drdered a man stationed in front of complainant's
place of business bearing "aba'ner with this strange device?"Strangers, Beware of Mock auctioneers.'
cellor said,

"It

is

clear to !y mind,

The Vice-Chan-

that the obstruction

of the complainant's lawful business, as detailed in the b
bill, constitute.; a nuisance against which equity xiii,
under brdinary circumstances, is bound to relieve.

/ / /

/

In this instance, on the case made on tile bill, although the
defendant did not interfere with the complainantt s trade and
occupation as an auctioneer, by blocking up the street and
side walk in front of his store, with teams or carts, so as
to impede the free ingress and egress of merchants and other
who might desire to attend his sales; he interripted aiid
destroyed the

complainant's business more effectually, by

keeping a man posted before the door of the latter, with the

34.
placard in staring capitals,
Auctioneers!

'Strangers, Be-orare of Mock

It may be that the placard wa, a libel,

which, unless justified, would subject the defendant to
corresponding punishment, both by wa' of damages and by indictment, but it was none the less a private nuisance,
injuriously and summarily affecting the property and lawful
pursuits of the complainant, and as such, it wa

falls with-

in the clearly established, and I may justly add, benefi.cent
jurisdiction of the court of Chancery.

And I am sure, no

one will feel the slightest apprehension of an undue or
dangerous exercise of the process of chancery, if they are
pushed no farther that to prevent one individual, whether be
be high in station or a private citizen, from trampling upon
his neighbor's rights, and utterly destroying his neighbor's
trade and business, without authority of law, by means of
an offensive and false placard or standing advertisement,
kept before his store or office.

The most zealous stickler

for the bill of rights~in our expiring constitution, will A.
not distrust the preservation of liberty of speech and of
the press, foomjthe suspension and punishment of such an
outrage'."

The injunction was dissolved on other grounds.

The next case and the first one to apply the injunction to labor troubles, is Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley,
L. R.,

6 Eq.,

the bill.

551.

This case was heard on a demurrer to

The employes of complainant were out on a strike

and the defendants posted notices in the vicinity of complainant's placeof business that read as follows:-

"Wanted

all well wishers of the Operative Cotton Spinners, &c.,
As.ociation not to trouble or cause an,' annoyance to the

65.
Springhead Spinning Company, Lees, b' knocking at the door
of their, office until the dispute

between them and

actor minders is finally terminated.
"Carrodus,22, greaves

Street, Oldham"

the self-

By special order"
The bill alleged

that"the said placards and advertisements were part of a
scheme of the defendants

/ /

, whereby they, by threats

and intimida~ion, prevented persons from hirin 1 themselves
to, o, accepting work from, the plaintiffs, and there were
divers persons in, and in the neighborhood of Springhead,
arid elsewhere, who, by reason of such notices and the liabilities under which they would place them in regard to the
association, were intimidated and prevented from hiring
themselves to the

plaintidfs(

granted an injunction and

Sir R. Mallins, V. C.,

in the course of his opinion said

"In the present case? the acts complained of are illegal and
criminal by the Act of Geo. 4, and it is admitted by the demurrers that they were designedly done as a part of a scheme
by threats and intimidationx, to :,revent persons from accepting work from the plaintiffs, and as a consequence, to
destroy the value of the plaintiffs' property.

It is, in

my opinion, within the jurisdiction of this court to prevent
such or any other mode of destroying property, and thexx
demurrers must therefore be overruled.
"In coming to this conclusion I desire to be understood as deciding simply upon what appears upoii this bill
and these demurrers"I
It is often said that this case and Dixon v.
L. R.,

7 Eq.,

Holden,

488, were overruled by Prudential Assurance

Co. v. Knott, L. R.,

10 Ch. App.,

14' , but an examination of
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that case shows that it does not go 4o that extent
criticizes some of the dicta i

Dixon v.

Hoideii.

but simpi
In Dixon

v. Holden the defendants were enjoined from publishing a
statement that the complainant was a secret partner of a
bankrupt firm and that he had concealed this fact for the
purpose of defrauding hreditors.

The statement wts f&lse/

The Vice-Chancellor wasn't content with confining himself
to the case at bar but said,"The business of a merchant is
about the most valuable kind of property he can well hav'e.
Here it is the source of his fortune, and therefore to be
injured in his business is to be injured in his property.
But IP go further. and say, if it had only injured his reputation, it is within the jurisdicti n of this court to
stop the publication of a libel of this description, which
goes to destroy his pc'operty or his reputation, which is
his property, and, if possible, rnor
property.

valuable than other

In this case I go on general principle, and I

am fortified by authority.

General principle is in favor

of it, but authorit, is not wantind

and further on the

Vice-Chancellor says9 "In the decision I alrive at, I ±Hx±x~x
beg to be 1jnderstood as laying down, that this uourt has
jurisdiction to prevent the publication of any letter, advertisement, or other document which, if permitted to go on,
would have

-he effect of destroying the -roperty

of another

person, whether that consists of tangible or intangible
property, whether it consists of mone

or reputation"'

It

is this dicta that the court takes exception to in Assurance
Co. v. Knott.

The only me-tion of the Spinning Co. case
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is that it was "decided by the Vice-Chancellor himself, upon
which of course the learned judge must be taken to have
expressed

the case of

the same opinion as he expressed in

Dixon v. Holden"

However, no such dicta can be found

in the Spinning Co. case and it was decided solely up,,n the
grounds that the demuy-rers admitted that there were "threats
and intimidations"
In

case,

the Assur'ance Co.

Lord Cairns,

L.

C. said,

"It is clearly settled that the court of chancery has no
jvrisdiction to restrain a publication merely because it
is a libel.

There are publications which the Court of

Chancery will restrain, and those publications, as to which
there is a foundatisn for the jurisdiction of a Court of
Chancery to restrain them, will not berestrained the less
because thay happen also to be libelous.

But apart from

the suggestion that the\ publication here is

a libel,

not observe in the bill an

I do

sta-tement or foundati n for the

tutieiction of the court to restrain.

I repeat, If the

observations are not libellous, they are lawful; and ought
not to be restrained; if they are libellous, it is only
because they are libellous that the courasked to rest-ain them

of Chancery is

After citing authorities showing

that a mere libel will not be -estrained,

he says,

only shadow of authority the other way is

in

"The

the case uf

Dixon v. Holden, decided by Vice-Chancellor Mallin
year 1868.

:-

in the

I say nothing about the decision in that partic-

ular case, and I do n,*t maen to say that the decision is not
capable of being raintained"

He then quotes the dicta
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already qioted arid criticizes

the same.

The case of Routh

v. Webster, 10 Beaven, F61, upon which "Dixon v. Holden was
professed to be decided?" was then discussed and stated "to
have been quite rightly decided".'

As the facts and prin-

ciple involved were ver, similar to Dixon v. Holden, it
can be readily seen that the uourt was not quarrelling with
the actilal decision in

that case but with the dicta qvo'ed.

Vice-Chancellor Mallins dlivnr-d two other opinions
holding the same principle as the Spinning Co. case.
Rollins v.
L. R.,

Minks,

18 Eq.,

L.

330.

R.,

13 Eq.,

355,

and Axrnann v.

LUnd.,

In both cases the defendant issued

circiilars stating that he would bring suit against any persa
who -bought certain articl~es from the complainant,

claiming

tha* these articles were an infringrment of his patent.

The

circulars were not issued bona fide to protect his rights,
but for the purpose of '"intimidating

the public and thcroby

totally destroying the trade of the ulaintiff'
V,/ Richardson, 59 How. Pr.,

See Croft

3r6.

In Sherry v. Perkins the defendants were restraind
from carrying a banner in the street in front of complainants place of business havihg the following inscription,
"Las-ers on a strike and lasters are requested

to keep away

from P. P. Sherry's until the present trouble is settled.
Per order L.

P.

Ihe defendants

T1.'

The court said, "The case finds that t1-

entered imts , with others,

into a scheme,

by threats and intimidation, to prevent persons ix
ployment of the plaintiff
orntemuing in su ch
jZ:Mnt~ andto prevet*R~othe Ar fr

x

x

empl oy-

ment, and to prevent others from enteving into such employ-

39.
ment.

/.

.

.

The act of displaying banners with devices

as a means of threats and Intimidationx to prevent persons
from entering into or continuing in the employment of the
plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs, and was illegal at common law and by statute.

.

.

.

We think that the

plaintiffs are not restricted to their remedj by an actiox
at law, but are entitled to relief by injunction.
and

4 he

The acts

injury were continiious"
In Emack v.

kana a

-,atentee of a "noiseless slate"

issued circulars under conditibns similar to those mentioned
in the English cases, arid an injunction was granted.
Blodgett,J., said, "It may not be libellous for the owner
of a patent to charge that an article made by another manufacturer infringes his patent: and notice of an alleged
infringement, may, if given in good faith, be a considerate
and kind acy on the .,art of the owner of the pateht; but
he gravamen of this case is the attempted intiiLid-.L, ,,byf
/

digendants of complainant's customers by threatening them
with suits which defendants did not intend to prosecute,
and this feature was not involved in Kidd v. Houry.
not believe that

I can-

a man is remediless against persistent and

continued attacks upon his business, and property rights in
his business, such as have been perpetrated by these defendants against the complainant, as shown by the proof in
this case.

It shocks my sense of justice to say that a

court of equity cannot restrain systematic and methodical
outrages like this, by one man upon another's property r±kkk
rights.

If a court of equity cannot reatrain an attack
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like this upon a man's business, then the party is certainly
becaiuse an actiml

remediless,

at law in

most cases would do

no good and ruin would be accomplished before an adjudication would be reached.

...

"The effect of the circulars sent by the defendant,
Kane, certainly must have been to intimidate dealers from
buying of complainant, or dealing in slates of his manufactulre,

because

of the alleged infringement

of the Goodrich

No busines-s man wants to incur the dangers of a

patent.

law suit for the profits he may make as a jobber in handling
goods charged to be al. infringement of another man's Datent.
The inclination of m4ost business men is to avoid litigation
and to forego even certaitn profits, if threatened with a
law suit which would be embarrassing and vexatious, and
might mulct them in damages far beyond their profits; and
hence such persons, although having full faith in a man's
integrity, and in the merits of his goods, would naturally
,r

avoid dealing with him for fear of possibly bevoming involved in the threatened litigation"
See
Mich.,

ASchool

558.

Furniture Co. v. School Furniture Co1 , 92
Casey v

typographical Union, 45 Fed.,

135.

Barr v. Trades CoujncilS, 53 N. J. Eq., 101.
I think it is clearly settled that "when the acts
complained of consist of such mis-representations of a business that they tend to its injury, and damage to its proprietor, the offense is simply a libel" and the couirts will
not graht an imjunction; but "on the contrary, when the attempt to injure consists of acts or words which will operate
to intimidate and prevent the customers of a party from

41.
dealing with or laborers from working for bim", t e courts
will interfere by injunction.
Union, 51 Fed.,

Coeur D'Alen &c. Y. Miners

267.

The principle is also redognized in three

Salmon v. Cotes, 91 L. T.,

cases decided in 1891.
Peto v. Apperley, id.,

English
353;

362, 386; and Haille v. Lillingstone.

The first was decided by Judge Collins; the last two by
Judge Jeune.

The judges didn't disagree on the principle,

but did disagree as to what would constitute intimidation.
See criticism on the cases at p. 393 of the same volume.

In Richter Bros. v. Tailors' Union, 24 Wk. L. Bull.,
189,

192,

absolutely

the inj~inction was refused because,
fails

"the petition

to show any act that was done pursiiant td)

the conspiracy, excepting the composing and circulation and
posting of the circulars.

No workman was deterred by the

circulars or posters, or by the threats of the defendants,
from engaging in work for or from continuing in the employment of the plaintiff.

No customer failed or refused to

patronize the plaintiff on either of these

xi

None of these facts are shown in the petition.

grounds.
No fact$ or

facts, constituiting a nuisance in law, or an in4terference
with, or destruction of, the plaintiff's business, or profits, are set out in the petition.
alities',

Its 'glittering gener-

its conclusions of fact and law, cannot be accept-

ed as ultimate facts'
In Sinsheimer v. Garment workers, 77 Hun, 215, reversing, 5 Misc.,

448, the injinction was dissolved because

(1) there was "no proof of any act of violence upon the part

42.
of the defendants, or of an-, injury to property, or of an'
threats or intimidation" because

(2)

the publi",ation of the

circulars had been discontinued some time before the injujnction was g-anted, and (3) because the complainants did not
come into equity with clean hands.

43.

T r e s p a s s.
As already seen strikers may use fair persuasion to
induce employes to join themlt but can the strikers trespass
In

upon the property of the complianant for this purpose?
Ry. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Wk. L. Bull., 306, it was held that
In this case the

they could 'ot.

court said; "From these

facts, it is clear to my mino that these men, when they went
there under the circumstances under which they went there,
were clearly trespassers, and that it was altogether and
essentially unlawful to go there, even, seeking to compel
or u:

o_ invite other men to abandon their employment, and

to thereby obstruct the business,..

It

It is a trespass.

is a wrong, and when I say this I do not mean to quystion
men off +he premises, by reasonable and

the rig t of thes
m

n

ti

_i

is

for their b

an

to go elsewhere or to cease their employment.
questio-. that right.

I do not

I do rnot find it necessary in this

case to question the right.
correct proposition

advFVtag

But what I do hold To be a

f iFaw is that while out of the

employ-

ment of this company, in this case as in other cases that
may arise, the parties so ceasing employment have

no right

to go upon the premises andby force or by violence or by
threats or by intimidation or by request, ask other men to
join them, or in any wlay interfere with or interrupt the
progress of the business that is then being sought

carried on.

to be

I do not believe there can be any difference

of opinion among reasonable men on this subject, and I
thiqk these troubles arise, in large measure, out of a mis-
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taken notion as to what the rights of men are7'
In Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore.,
it was alleged that "the executive committee

.

.

.

.537,
without

leave or license, and without lawful business, entered the
and ordered all

demises of +he plaintiff

union men to quit"

"If this was a willful aggression upon plaintiff's rights,
it would constitute trespass, for which an action would lie
The injunction was refused because

souinding in damages

"no intimidation is speciffically alleged or shown, unless
it can be inferred that by a refusal to quit)the members of
the union would subject themselves to the charge of insubordination to the order, and it does not appear that there
was sufficient odium attached to this to put the members in
fear,

or that compliance with the order and resolution was

induced thereby"

Nothing wa,: said on the question of tres-

pass, but as it was a single act, already committed, and its
repetition was not threatened, it would Aot seem to be a
proper case for anN injunction.
v. Ratchford on P

/

6f

See quotation from Mackall

.

A trespass for the purpose of interfering with complainant's buisiness or destroyin- property will also be enjoined.
260/

Coeur D'Alene &c. Co. v. miners Union, 51 Fed.
Davis v. Zinmerman, 91 Hun, $89.

ford, 82 Fed., 42.
306.

U).

My. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Wk. L. Bull.,

S. v. Debs, 64 Fed.,

the action was begun

persons

724.

In Davis v. Zimmerman

o restrain defendants

destroyins plaintiffs' property"
"all

1ackall v. Ratch-

'

.

.

(3) from

In Miachall v. Ratchford,

were restrained from entering upon the property

45.
loal & Coke Co. for the purpose of interfer-

of the Montana

ing with the employes of said company, either by intimidation,

or by the hiolding of either private or public assem-

blages upon said proerty, or in any way molesting, interfel
ing with,

or intimidati9 the employes of that company so

as to induce them to abandon their work in the said mines,
In

Ry.

Co.

v.

'Venger,

the defendants were restrained,

"from

in any manner whatever molesting or interfering with any
engine,

tender,

car,

s-withh,

coupling,

engine-house,

depot,

watertank or prop)erty, applittenance or freight bpon said
premises"
It

i3

also held that where a large body of strikers

narch up aud down the highway in the vicinity of complainants'

place of business so as to interfere with with and ob-

struct his business, it is a trespass and violates an injunction against trespass.
Ratchford.

Cook v. Dolan.

Mackall v.

In Cook v. Dolan the court said, "it was a

trespass upon the plaintiff's land, which had been forbidden
The highways can undoubtedly be used b, Iarge bodies of men
for parades within reasonable limits; but a

2 arade

which is

±iUmIx to a limited piece of a

confined wijk±x xxzKk:Ki

public road before- a pit-moli and "nder a tram-way,
which is

rereated two

and

or three times a day for ten days or

two weeks, loses the characteristic of a legitimate p;arade,
and when directed against the interests of the owner of the
land over which the road passed, becomes a trespass.

We

hold, therefore, that these marches are in violation of the
injunction, in that they

.

. .

(2) were a trespass on their

(plaintiffs) property at or near the pit-mouth of their

46.
This holdig is supported by both principle and

mine.'
authority.

Lewis v. Jones, 1 Pa. St., 336.

"andall, 29 Mich.,

4 .

Hunt v. Rich, 38 Me.,

11ollenbeck v. Rowley, 8 Allen, 473.
Barb., 393.

Rogers v.
195.

Adams v. Rivers, 11

Harriso!; v. Puke of Rutland, 1893, 1Q. 3.,

142

The g'ounds for restraining a trespass are well stated in Rivhter Bros. v. Tailors Un/ion,where it is said, "The
t/respass if a single act, must be irreparable, the injury
threa'ened or done must be of such a character, that

'e

property injured cannot be Testored to its former condition,
or that compen.3ation cannot be afforded by damages.

If the

trespass is continuouis in its character, though not destructive, irreparable, then a court of equity

entertains juris-

diction, because by an action at law the plaintiff cannbt
recover damages which constitute a complete and certain relief.

3 Por.

Eq. J/, sec. 1357,,

47.
P a y i n g

I

o n e y

&c.

In Rogers v. Evarts it was held that "the offer by
defendants of money to pay expenses of the employe is lADful.
The assistance given to

4

hose needing it is lawful, even if

offered as an inducement to the employe to leave.
o-nly a just provision to those

It is

who have surrendered their

wages, perhaps from sympathy form defendants.

The posting

of names of those who contribute to funds sought and lawfully used for sustaining the strike,

and of those who re-

fuse to contribute, is lawful as long as the strikers keep
within the law.

If, however, their purpose be an unlawful

on*,and n ot for an advance of wages, or if they seek to
un
accomplish a lawful end by 'lawful means, t' en they are guilty
of illegal conspiracy, and the posting of the names of the
contributors and non-contributors is a part of such conspiracy and unlawful"
The converse of this proposition is held in the English cases of Warburton Y/ H-uddersfield Industrial Society,
1892, 1 Q. B., 817;
kxxRx,x~xxx~xyx99R
and Farrer v. Close, L. R., 4 Q. B.,602.
However these case seem to be. governed by the construction
put on the English Statutes and the by-laws of the associations concerned.

It wokld seem that on principle the New

York case is correct.
"within the law!

The strikers have certainly kept

The offer of money is surely not a threat

or intimidation, but rather a species of 'peaceable I or
'moral'

persuasion.

48.
B O Y C 0 T T S.
In-o3race Bros. v. Evans, 18 Pitts. L. J.,
said;

"In popualr kaxgxxg, acceptation it

399, it is

(boycott) is an

organized effort to exclude a person from business relations
with others by persuasion, intimidation and other acts which
tend to violence and thereby coerce him through fear of resulting injury, to submit to dictation in the management of
his affairs"

It will be noticethat the above definition

assumes that a boyjcott is in its essence unlawful, but there
are many cases holding the contrary and it would not seem
to be necessarily true.

A much better definition is the

one given by Judge Taft in Toledo &c. Co. v. Penn. Co.,
Fed. 730/

He4Qsays,

54

"As usually understood, a boycott is a

combination of many to cause a lass to one person by'coercing others, against their will, to withdraw from him their
beneficial business intercourse, through threats that, unless those others do, the many will cause similar harm to
them"

By 'coercion' Judge Taft evidently-rmeans the

'moral

persuasion' caused by a fear of loosing the profits of their
business and not the use5of unlawful force or acts, for he
says, "Ordinarily, when such a combination of persons does
not use violence, actual or threatened, to accomplish their
purpose, it is dificlt to point out with clearness the illegal means or endx which makes the combination an unlawful
conspiracy; for ittis generally lawful for the combiners'to
withdraw their intercourse and its benefits from any person,

49.
and to announce their intenlion of doi"It so, and it is
equally lawful for the others, on their own motion, to do
that which the combiners seek to compel them to do'
Thus, we see that a boycott is an organized effort
to destroy the biisiness of a certain person and it may be
either lawful or unlawful.

It is very difficult to point

out just where the line falls between a lawful and an unlawful boycott, on account of the contradict/inns to be
found in

the cases.

I take it to be a sound proposition of law that a man
cannot recover in an action against another, unless he has
been injured; and that a man cannot be injured unless he
has A legal right and this lagal right has been infringed
and he has suffered damage thereby.
Dutt, 13 M.oo. P. C!, 209, 241.
307.

Rogers v.

Larson v.

Rajendro

Ohase, 47 Minn.,

In a boycott is any legal right of the person boy-

cotted invaded?

It is simply an attempt to prevent him

from entering into business relations with others, to prevent 1im from making future contracts, in other words, to
interfere with his right to gain a livelihood.

Supposing

a combination of men, for the purpose of ruining A, persuade
all

wholesalrs to refrain from dealing with A,

unlawful means, does A have an action?

uising no

In the solution of

that problem, I assume that if the combination have s-he right
to so persuade the whol alers then a cannot recover, for "an
by a malicious or bad motive
act lawful in itself is not converted"into an unlawful act
so as to make the doer of the act liable to a civil action,
But have they the right?

They have unless thej have

fered with some right of A's.

inter-

With what right of A's have

50.
they interfered?,

Simply the right which Svery man has "to

pursue his trade or calling without molestation or obstruction, and any who by any act, though it be not otherwise unlawful, molests, or obstructs him is guilty of a wrong unless he can s :ow lawful justification of excuse for so doing,
Unless this is a correct proposibion of law I fail to see
how the boycott cases can be sustained.
,Instead of commencing with the first case I will star+
with one of the latest.
v. flood, 1898, A. C.,

In the late English case of Allen
1, the -Ilaintiffs, memhers of one

trade union, were employed in making repairs on a ship.

The

defendant was a delegate of another trade -union, some of
the members of which were employed on the same ship.

Defen-

dant informed the employers that unless the plaintiffs were
discharged all the ironworkers (his union men) would quit w.z
work Saying that "he plaintiffs had been doing ironwork in
another ward.

The plaintiffs were discharged and bring

this actiort for damages.

The plaintiffs were employed

by the day but would have been retained but for this interference.

The case was full

considered and the House of

Lords finally decided that the action would not lie.

I do

not now quarrel with the result of Allen v. Flood but I do
quarrel with the ratio deciondi of the Lords.

They decid-

ed that (1) the proposition I have stated was not sound law
and

(2) that as no unlawful means were used to procure

plaintiffs discharge the action would not lie.
Let us examine the authorities bearing on the first
proposition and see what result is obtained.

In Comyn's

51.
Digest (Action on the Case, A,)

it is said, "In all cases

where a man has a temporal loss, or damage by the wrong of
another, he may have an action upon the case, to be repaired
in damages"
n. c. 3,)

In Viner's Abridgement

(Actions on the Case,

it is said, "If those that are coming to my market

are disturbed, or beat, per qujod, I lose my toll, an action
upon 1-he case lies"
And again, (same title, 21,) "If a
man menaces my tenants at will, of life and members, per
quod they depart fnom their tenures, an4 action upon the cas
lies against him"
Wylde,J., said

In Turner v. Sterling, 2 Vent., 25,

(44

41Edw. III, 24,B,)

"If I have an

horse or beast market, and a toll for sale, and one hinder
the beasts from coming hither, non constat whether they
should !,e sold, yet for the possibility of that and of the
loss of the toll thereon, an action lies
Ddnesham case, 29 Edw. II1,

In the Abbe of

18, b, the Abbe by grace of the

King was entitled to hold a fair at Stow, and the defendants
with "force and arms" disturbed "certain persons coming to
the aforesaid fair," whereby the Abbe 'lost his toll and the
profits of the fair, to the damage," Mc.
actionable.

This was held

In Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 TEast 574n;

s. c. polt 14, 17, 19; 3 salk 9; 11 Modern 74,1-50, the defendant maliciously fired a gun near the plaintiff's decoy
and drove the wild-fowl away.
was a good cause of action.

Holt, C. J.,
In the

said that thes

course of his opinion

he said, "This is his (plja njff) trade;

and he that hin-

ders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering him7'

And again, "V7her.e

a violent or

5;:.

way of
cases.

pvofession,

done to a man's occupation,

malicious act is

or

getting a livelihoe; thefe An action lies in all
But if

a man doth ',im damage by using the same

employment; as if Mr. Hicket'ingill had set lip another decoy
and that had spoiled

on his own ground near the pd aintiff,

the custom of the plaintiff, no action would lie, because
he had as much liberty to make and use a decoy as the plaintiff.

This is like the case of 11 H. IV, 47.

One school-

master set up a new school to the damage of anmxx ancient
school, and thereby the scholArs are allured from the old
there
school to come to his new.
(The action"was held not to lie)
But suppose Mr.

H ickeringill should lie in

the way with his

gins, and fright the boys from going to school, and their
parents would not let them go thither; sure that schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his scholars.
*

.

4*an hath a market, to which he hath toll for horses

sold; a man is bringing his horses to market to sell; a
stranger hinders and obstructs him from going thither; an
action lies because it imports damage.

Action upon the

case lies against one that shall by threats fright away his
tenants at will"
case.

Carrington v. Taylor is an extreme c

Here the defendant was shooting fowl for his own

benefit where he had a lawful right to shoot.

Fe frighten-

ed the ducks away from the plaintiff's decoy and was held
liable for so doing.
In Tarleton v.

This case can hardly be supported.

M'Gawley, Peake 11 P. , 270,

the plaintiff',

vessel was lieing o~f the coast of Africa at Calabar where
he was trading with the natives.

The defendant,"well

knowing the premises, but contriving and maliciously intend-

53.
ing to hinder and deter the natives from trading" with the
plaintiff, "with force and arms, fired . . . a certain cannon loaded with gunpowder and shot at the said canoe, and
killed one of the natives on board the same.

Whereby the

natives of the said coast were deterred and hindered from
trading with " &c.

ahd plaintiffs lost their trade.

Kenyon held that the action would lie.
Peat, 3 H.

,,C.,

Lord

In Ibotson v.

643, the plaintiff had enticed and allured

certain grouse from the lands of the Duke of Rmtand by
placing on his own land "near to the lands of the said Duke,
quantities of corn and other substances on which grouse feed
and was then and the'e about to shoot the said grouse,
wherefore the defendant' as the servant of the said Duke,
and by his command, in order to prevent the plaintiff from
shooting" &c. "fired, explod-ed, and projected, and caused
to be fired, exploded and projected, certain offensive, injurious, noxious, terrifying and dangerous rockets, fireworks,

missils,

projectiles and combustibles,

caused to be made xxx±at

and made and

divers loud, jarring, annoying and

disturbing noises close to and over the said lands of the
plaintiff.,

Thereby the grouse and other game "were scare4

frightened and driven away from the said land of the plaintiff"

The judges were unanimously of the opinion that this

was actionable.
c.,

2 Rolle,163,

In Garrett v. Taylor, Cro. Jac.,

567, s.

the plaintiff was the owner of a stone

quarry, and the defendant, "to discredit and deprive him of
the commodity of the said mine, imposed so many and so great
threats upon. his workmen, and all come-s distrrbed, threat-

54.
ening to mayhem and vex them with suits if the

bought any

stones Ef ±k; whereupon they all desisted from buying
1'eld,

and the othe.s from working &c1.1

"The threatening to

and suits, whereby they durst Lot work or buy,

mayhem,

is

a great damage to the plaintiff, and his loosing the benefit
of his quarries a godd cause of action"'
Astor,

4 J.

for his

B.

Foore,

(plaintiff)

iJ,,

"4e

workmen,

In

Guntner v.

defen'Jants clandestiniely sent
and hav- ng caused them to be

intoxicated, induic d them to leave him and come to them by which the plaintiff was nearly if not qx±t
ruined"

A~ew trial was moved fc#

absoll tely

on the ground

(inter

alia) "that as the me , worked by the piece, each of them was
justified in leaving the plaintilf when he had completed the
worX he had ih hand"
A±&x±dgi,
Allcott,

The motion was denied.z btxxk xx

R zxmiax &A* :kk
2 D. & E.,

166,

k x
4 he

xx
R

frx

In

Bennett v/

de-"endant seduced the daughter

fo the plaintiff, s'e being over twenty-one.

There was no

existing co:itract of service between the father and daughter
The plaintiff was allowed to recover.
L.R.,

2 C. P.,

In Evans V. Walton

615, the defendant enticed away the plaintiff

daughter who was nineteen years of age.

The defendant did

not debauch her, and ther was no contract of service.
this case 'he action for seduction woold not lie.
Plaintiff recovered.

In

The

In Levet's case, Cro. Eliz.,

289,

the plaintiff was an inn-holder in D. and "The defendant
spake these words,

'Thy houise is infected with the pox; and

thy wife was laid of the pox

Held, "Actionable for it is

a discredit to the ,plaintiff and guests would not resort

55.
IN Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. Div.,

thither"

91i

the defen-

dant stated that the plaintiff's wife, who assisted plaintiff

in

conducting his business,

had been guilty of adul-

tery, whereby plaintiff lost trade and customers.
It will be >%oticed that in all these cases except
Keeble v. Hickeringill, Carrington v. Taylor, Ibotson v.
a-n4 the last tw3 the act which "he defendant procured

Peat,

the third party to desist from doing, was not one which the
plaintiff could 'ave compeled the third party to perform.
It was simply one which
the defendant had

would probably have been done if

not interfered.

In other words the

right to do business withoiut moles-ation has

plaintiff's

been interfered with and he has been allowed to recover.
There are no other grounds on which the action can be based.
IN many of the cases means that were in se unlawful were
used to accomplish the desireot end.

In Allen V/

it is sought to distinguish them on this ground.
104,

135,

ic.-

A stands in

Flood,
(p. 66,

The Lords woijld have us believe that if

front of B's s-tore and

(without using any un-

lawful means),persuades customers not to enter and trade
with B, then B has no action; But if A stands there with a
cliub and prevents customers from entering, Ahas an action,
simply because in one case the means used are in
and in

the other unlawful.

the customers in

e lawful

I can readily understand how

the second case could have anlction for

assault and in the first case they could not, but I cannot
see why B has an action in one ca;e and not in the other for
the reaso-ns given by the House of Lords.

What

right has
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been interfered with in the second case that was not interfered
with in the first?

Has the use of unlawful force by A ag-

ainst the customers created a new right in B?
not.

I apprehend

He either has or he has not a right, and bf he has the

right it has been infringed in both cases; if he hasn't any
right, there aan be no action in either case.

If it were said

that he had a right but we will allow any interference with
that right which isn't brolight about by the use of unlawful
means, then we would have and understandable proposition; but
to deny the right and allow an action where unlawful means are
used and simply for that reason is nothing if it is notincomprehensible.4: Bu3t that is
Lards say in Allen v. Flood.^

ca1tically what the majority of the
Lord Herschell says,

(p. 137)

"Speaking generally, l/elieve these actions would equally have
been maintainable if a similar wrongful act had caused damage
to,

qrihad affected the legal right of, a person wholly un-

connected with trade"

I quite agree with Lord Herschell that

an action would lie where the wrongful act had "affected the
legal rights" of another, but I can't see how the action would
lie where the wrongfijl act had simply "caused damage

",

unless

that damage had been suffered through the invasion of a legal
right.

If A does a wrongful act, does every one who suffers

damage thereby have an action?

I think not.

It is gener-

ally conceded thatia man has no property right in percolating
underground waters." &onIfM.A digs a well on his land for the
purpose of cutting off B's supply, B has no, action, for no
right, of his has been interfered with and the personal spite
of A makes no difference.

But suppose X, using no unlawful
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means, maliciously induces A to dig the well, does B have an
action?

Iishould sayino, for no right of his has been inGo one step further,

terfered with.

A refuses to dig

the well, andgets his gun, arid says to A, "Dig or you are
A digs and ]I's water supply is cut off, does

a dead man"

B have an action?

He has suffered damage through the wrong

ful act of X against A, but what right of his has been interfered with?

Has he been deprived of anything he had

a legal right too?

The answer clearly is, no.

A man

cannot suffer legal damage unless a right of his has been
interfered with.

A certainly has his action for assault

arid thetdamage to his freehold, but where B comes in is
more than I can fathom.

The same illustrations could be

appliedAto the building of a high fence for the purpose of
cutting off B's light aad air.

In England B would have an

action because there a man has a rigt to his light and air,
but in, this country he wouldtnot for he hasn't any such
right.

And yet they tell uscthat inoGarrett v.(,Taylor

and Tarletonjv. M'Gawley the plaintiff was allowed to recover because4he had suffered damage through the wrongful
act of the defendant.

I should say that he was allowed to

recover because "a right" of his had been infringed, and
there was no legal excuse for the infringement.
was the right to gain a livelihood.

That right

A man cannot suffer

legal damage from any act (wrongful or not) of another, unless that act has interfered with some right of,"his to his
detriment.

Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn.,

Mockett, 2 B & C.,

934.

307'

Hannam v.

58.
The key note of the situation is struck in Sibver &
State Council v. Rhodes, 7 Colo. App.,

211, where the court

says, "The plaintiff is a corporation, and to entitle it
to relief it must appear that its corporate rights are threatened with some injury of a kind which may be made the subject of an action, and for which courts have the power to
afford redfes.

The complaint is that the defendants

have banded together and conspired to 'exterminate' the
plaintiff; and that they propose to accomplish their purpose
by compelling its mgmbers to leave it.

Of course, when

its members have all withdrawn, it will be extinct.

We

nedd not discuss the character of the means to be employed
for its disintegration.

Whether they are legal or ille-

gal, thay cannot be made the subject of an action in favor
of the Lpaintiff.

It has no prop-ety in its members, and

in loosing them it sustains no damage which the law necognizes as damag.

It cannot compel its members to re-

main with it, and if they are violently driven out of it,if they arelforced to relinquish their membership against
their will,-

the greivance is theirs and not the plaintiff(S

Or if, for the ptirpo6e of forcing their withdrawal, others
by means of 'boycotts' or 'strikes', are made to suffer, the
latter must fight their own battles.
make the plaintiff their champion.

The law does not
The disorganization

and resulting extinction of the plaintiff would doubtless
be a calamity; but it is one which the law is powerless to
avert"

It isn't necessary to agree with the court in
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holding that the plaintiff "has no property in its members",
but assuming that it has none,

then whether the means used

to obtain their withdrawal be legal or illegal can certainly
make no difference so far as plaintiff's right to recover

is O....h c

,pf the word unlawful' is most unfortunate and

it isqas liable to cause as much trouble as the word
cious/'

It cannot te accurately defined.

'mali-

If it had

been confined to acts which were in themselves criminal or
which would give rise to an action in tort entirely unconnected with this subject we would have something definite,
,but it isn't so confined.

Indeed it isn't even confined

to overt acts but includes threats to do acts and the gathering of large hostile crowds &c.

It is quite well settled

that the threat to harass one with groundless suits will be
enjoined, even under circumstances where an action for malicious prosecution would not lie.

Opprobrious epithets

also fall within the proscribed class.

Either of these

offenses could be committed under circumstances where they
would be neither criminal or tortious, but every well regulated mind will instinctively say that they are not decent
methods of persuasion, and that no court should stamp them
as 'lawful'.

Social ostracism seems to have fallen under

the ban in\(eglehan v. Guntner.

This is an entirely diffe-

ent thing from thosep mentioned and one which may be the
subject of grave,!doubt.
it

(It certainly was in that case.)

is not so easy to see why this should bedcalled unlawful.

It would weem to stand o-: an equal footing with a -efusal
to have business in4ercourse.

It is both decent and proper

b.
However there can be no accurate definition given of the6Q.
One can only

word 'unlawful' as used in this connection.

guess at whether a certain thing is or is not a nuisance by
looking up the decided cases, so it is with 'unlawful' means,
In the cases of Keeble v. hickeringill, Carrington v.
Taylor,and

Ibotson v. Paatl we have a different

of circumstances.

combination

In these cases the defendant had driven

awajgame from the plaintiff's land by firing guns aid--4. on
his own adjoining land.

It is attempted to distinguish

these xases on the ground that the acts constituted a nuisance.

(p. 27, 133, 174),

and Lord Herschell lays down

this astounding proposition of law, (133) "The case may be
supported, and the observation of Lord Holt, which has been
quotedA expliined by the circumstance that if the defendant
ner-ely fired on his own land in

the ordinary use of it,

his neighbor could make no complaint, whilst, if he was not
firing for any legitimate purpose, connected with the ordinary
sance.

se of the land,
sIn

he might be held to commit a nui-

this view of it

Keeble v.

Hickeringill has,

of course, no bearing on the present case"

I say this

proposition is astounding because it makes the act a nuisance "if he wag not firing for any legitimate purpose, connected with the ordinary use of the land" and not a nuisance
id he "merely fired on his own land in the ordinary use of
it"

It strikes me

t hat

there are many cases in which the

lawful use of property has been declared a nuisance on account of the sbrroundAng circumstances.
"It is merely a question of rights.

ood says,

(p.1O)

The motives of the

parties have no connection with the inquiry, or bearing upon

61.

the result.

Qn act, hawever malicious, however wrongful

in its intent, or however serious in its consequences, may
be so far within the scope of the parties right as not to
be a -,uisance or produce an actionable injury; while upon
the other hand a party who devotes his premises to a use
that is strictly lawful in itself, that is friitful of great
benefits to the community, that adds materiall,.0 to its wealO
and enhances its commercial impor-ance and prosperity, and
whose motives are good, and intentions laudable even, may
find that by reason of the violation of the rights of those
in the vicinity of his works, from results that are incident
to his business, and that cannot be so far corrected as to
prevent the injury complained of, his works are declared
a nuisance, his business stopped, and himself inv6lved in
financial ruin"

But according to Lord Herschell, if I

start a blacksmith's shop in a resident community and by
lighting my fires, and smoking every one out of the pdaee,
without shoeing any horses, I am guilty of maintaining a
nuisance; but if I do shoe horses, then I am not guilty of
maintaining one.

This is queer law.

If in Keeble v.

ITickeringill the defendant's act was a sufficient disturbance of the plaintiff's property right in one case to constitute a nuisancq, why wasn't it in the other?

Does a

gun make more noise when it is fired at random into the
atmosphere than when fired at a bird?

But it is evident

from the language of C. J. holt that he did not deal with
the

case as one of nuisance for he says,

(llModern, *4,75)

"Suppose the defendant had shot in his own ground, if he had
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occasion to shoot, it would have been one thing, but to
shoot on purpose to damage the planitiff is another thing,
.

and a wrong.
record,

but it

.

is

.

It nust be taken as found upon the

found to be done malitos4,

appeared upo-n the evidence"

and so it

But supposing it were a

nuisance, does Keeble have an action if no right of his has
been infringed?

And what right of his has been infringed

in this case?
of view?

Isn't it the same right from either point

Tt seems to me that it is and that the attempted

distinction is
In

unsound.

levet's case and Riding v.

spoke slanderous

Smith,

the defendant

wUords of the plaintiff's wife whereby

the plaintiff lost customers &c.

Ordinarily a man has no

action for slander spoken of his wife, why did he have it
in this case?

Because his customers did not care to come

in contact with his wife, and as she assisted him in his
shop, he thus lost their trade.
C. B.,

In the last case Kelly,

said, "It appears to me that if a man states of an-

other, who is'a trac(er earning his livelihood by dealing
in articles of trade, anything, be it wh-tt it may, the
natural consequence of uttering which would be to injure
his trade and prevent persons resorting to the pace of business

,

and it so leads to loss of trade, it is actionable,
What bearing has Lumley v. Gye, 6 E. & B.,

this question?

218, on

Many of the judges in Allen v. Flood thought

that the case ea- be supported only on the ground that it
is an interference with a
livelihood.

(34, 50, 60.)

man's trade or right to gain a
Cave, J. says,

(34) "It is
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anomalous, because in no other instance in the En lisk law
that I am aware of does a right ex contractu give rise to
a rilrht in rei.

In no other case that I know of can two

persons by agreement between themselves create an obligation
binding on all the rest of the world"

It seems to me that

the case can be sustained on either ground.

I can sec no

good reason for saying that a man has a right to interfere
with a right of another simply because that right arises
out of a contract.

I don't think any man has any right

to interfere with another's ri-ht

unless he can show some

*legal justificatinn or excuse'
But "it is said that the company were acting within
their legal rights in discharging plaintiffs"

"So they wo

were but does that affec + the question of the responsibility of the persons who caused tham so to act by the means
cust omers
he used?
Clearly not.
In Garrett V/ Taylor the kfr±xxx
were not obliged to buy any stones; in Tarleton v. M'Gawley
the natives were riot bound to trade with the plaintiff;
nor
in the Abbe of Deneshan case were the persons bound to
come to his fair.

"The question is, what was the cause

of their wxercising their legal right?

The question isn'%

was any legal riruht of the third party injured by the defendany or was any legal right of the plaintiff injured by the
third party, but it is, was any legal right of the plaintiff
injured by the act of the defendant.
It seems to me that the result of these cases is that
"a malicious

(without legal justification

or excuse) act

done to a man's way of getting a livelihood is actionable7'
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Lord Halsbury made but one mistake when he said, "I/am encouraged, however by the consideration, that the adverse
views appear to me to overrule the views of most distinguished judges, going back now for certainly 200 years, and
that up to the period when this case reached your lordshpps
House there was a unanimous consensus of opinion.

Instead

of saying 200 years he should have said from the time of the
Abbe.of Denesham's case, over five hund-'ed years.
This position is clearly sustained by the remarks of
L. J. bowen in the Mogul case.
v.

(See Lord Halsbury in Allen

Flood, p. 76, as to their being dicta.).

(1892, A. C.,

25.)

And on appeal

the law as laid down by Sir Hohn Holt

was expressly approved by Lord Field and referred to by
Lord Bramwell.

It is also supported by Tempertlon v.

Russell, 1993, 1 Q. B.,

715.

Several of the Lords reserved their opinion as to
the result of the case if there had been a combination instead of one.

But it is difficult to see how a combin-

ation of men could injure a right which no one has any more
than A person could injure it.

From whatever direction you

approach the case one is confronted with the sane proposition - Is there a right?

65.
can

Ameri

cases.

In this couhtry, "life, liberty and propertyl are
protected by the constitution of the United States, and by
the constitutions of the various States.

Under this claiuse

"the right to do business" has been held to be property and
protected from legislative acts tending to abridge its free
exercise.
155 Mass.,

People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y.,
117.

Brace ville Coal Co.,

66.

Ritchie v. People, 1F5 Ill/, 98.

Co.,

41 Neb.,

court said,

127.

389.

Com. v. perry

v. People, 147 111/,
Low v. Rees Printing

In Braceville Coal Co. v. people, the

"Property in its broader sense, is not the

physical thing which may be the subject of ownership, but
is the right of dominion, possession and power of disposition which may be acquired over it, and the right of propery
preserved by the constitution, is the right not only to
possess a'd enjoy it, but also to acquire it in any lawful
mode, or by following any lawful industrial pursuit which
the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty guaranteed,
may choose to adopt.
all wealth.

Labor is the primary foundation of

The property which each one has in his own

laber is the common heritage, and, as an incident to the
right bo acquire other property, the liberty to enter into
contracts by which labor may be employed in such way as the
laborer shall deem most beneficial, and of others to employ
sujclj labor is necessarily included in the constitutional
gvarantyx.

In the Frorer case, 141 Ill.,

171, we said:

'The privelege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right, and if A is denied the right to contract and

66.
acquire property in the manner which he has heretofore enjoyed under the law, and which B, C*&

D are still allowed

by the law to enjoy, it is clear that he is deprived of
both liberty and property to the extent that he is thus
denied the rig;ht to contract'
general rule in

it may be safely statec, as a

this country 'that

the business of a person,

4.CIF LAWFULLY CONDUCTED? IS A PROPERTY RIGHT'
Ry. Co. v. M'cConnell, 82 Fed.,
Cases, 16 Wall., 36, 116.
289.

7:.J. Eq.,

223,

slaughter House

State v. Stewart, 59 Vt.,

CarewLV/ Rutherford, 106 M1ass.,

Coincil, 53
Mo.,

65, 80/

Nashville &C

101, 112.

2 73,

Parr v. Trades

1.

Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131

Lolden v. Hardy, 18 U. S. Sup. Ct. 7ep.? 383.

People v. Barrondess, 61 Hun, 7071, rev's'd, 131 N

Y.,

649,

(te court adopting the dissenting opinion of jijdge Daniels
in

the (leneral-Term.)

In this case Judge Daniels said? "A

loss resulting from the suspension or interruption of the
business would necessa-ily be an injury to property.
Business is property, as much so as the articles themselves
which are included in its transactions7

The question is

how far have the courts recognized this property right in
t

tie boycott cases?

I think it may be safely stated that wherever the
dottftse of Lumley v. Rye has been passed upon in this country it has been approved, except in Cal.,
Boyson v- Thorn, 98 Cal.,
Ky., 121.

578.

Conmmission Co.,

and Ky.

Chambers V/ Baldwin, 91

Boulier v. Macauley, 91 Ky/,

Gravel Co. v.

Mo.)

138 11o.,

235.

Sand &

439.

Of the cases that deal with the other phases of the
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subject Walker V. Cronin, 107 Mass., 555, is an early and
well considered case.

The plaintirf

was a manufacturer

The first count of the declaralton alleged that

of shoes.

the defendant

"

unlawfully and without justifiable cause

molest, obstruct and hinder the plaintiffs, from carrying
oX.said business, with the tnlawful purpose of preventing
t e plaintiffs from varrying on their said business, and
willfully persuaded and induced a large number of persons,

(1) who were in the employment of the plaintirfs

.

.

.

and

(2) others who were about to enter 6he employment of the
plaintiffs'.

It will be noticed that in one case t~ie em-

ployes were

'ot bound to remain and in the oth er they were

not bound to become employes.

Wells, J.,

said:-

"This

sets forth sufficiently (1) intentional and wilful acts (2)
calculated to. cause damage to the plaintiff in their lawful
business,

(3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause shch

damage and loss, without right or justifiable caiuse on
the part.,of _he defendant,

(which constitutes malice,) and

(4) actual damage and loss resulting:

"Every one has the

right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit.

Be has no right to

be protected against competition; but he has a right to be
free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or
annoyanve.

If disturbance or loss comes as a result of

competition, o- the exercise of like rights by others, it
is damnum, absque injuria, unless some superior right by
contract or otherwise is interfered with.

But if it comes

from the merely wanton or malicious act of others, without
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the justification of competition or the service of any interest

or lawful pirpose, it then stands upon a different

footing, and falls within the principle of the authorities
first referred too"
The second and third

counts alleged that defend

nt

induced certain workmen to break existing cowttracts &c.

The

opinion ends thus, "Upon careful consideration of the authorities, as well as the principles

involved, we are of

opinion tT.t a legal cause of action is sufficiently stated
in each of the three counts of tke declaration"

The case

contains an elaborate review of the English au 4 >orities
and the cases where force &c. were used are cited to sustain the principle involved.
In Hughes v. McDonough, 43 N. J. L.,
tiff was a blacksmith.

The defend,ant,

459, the plain-

"maliciously intend#

ing to injure the plaintiff in his trade" loosened a shoe
which plai.tiff

had recentl7

--it

on t; e mare of one Van

Ripper and also drove a nail in the mare's hoof, intending
to "'-us

deprive the pAaintiff of the patronage of the said

Van Ripper"
said,

It was Lneld actionable.

Beasley, C. J.,

"T'he act had a two fold injurious aspect: it

was cal-

culated to injure both Van Ripper and the vpllainti{'f; and
as each was directly damnified, I can perceive no reason
why each could not repair his losses by an action'
In Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. L.,
N

J.

L.

8/9',

284,

s.c.,

56

the defendantsl ,,by means of corrupt, fraud-

ulent and deceitful max~x

representations and statements as

69.
to the rersonal and business character and s~anding of the
plaintiff"

induc:-.d the firm from which shh bought to refuse

to sell to her and to recall
the consignors

refuse to send the goods to her,

it

appear that she vould have any remedy against them.
could send or recall them at pleasure.
is, t-at

"If

goods already sent her.

does not
They

The complaint here

.he goods in the plaintiffs possession were re-

called, and her advantageous arrangement for credit with
the consignors

ended,

of the defendant.

.

by the .fraudu lent and malicious act
.

.

The diffeence between this act

tion and slander, is well sta'ed in Riding v. Smith, 1,L. R,
Ex. D.,

91, where a slander against the wife was charged as

having injucred the husband's business.

Her name was strik-

en from the record, as a joint plaintiff, and the action
was allowed to proceed by the husan,
d ,

t-d,',

carry-

ing on business, founded on an act done by the defendant
which led to loss of trade and custom by the pdaintiff.
It was maintainable on the ground that the injury to the
plaintiff's

b,,usiness wa.82 the natural consequence

of the W

words spoken, which would preventpersons resorting to the
plaintiff's shop"
400.

See also, Delz v. winifree, 80 Tex.,

Jackson V. Stanfield, 137 Lnd.,

Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq.,
167 Mass. 92.

Olive v.

101.

592.

Barr v. EssexW

Veglehan v-. Guntner,

Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. APP.J 630

Let us examine the American cases where the facts are
similar to Allen v. Flood, i. e. X gets A to break a contract with B, the contract being one terminable at the will
ofreither party.
43 Ga.,

601,

The earliest case issSalter v. Howard,
Tn this case the defendant

enticed away

70.
The court said, "The

certain laborers from the plaintiff.

fact that these servants were under employment by H. (pl'ff)
and in performance of such agreement, were upon his place
at work,

constituted as to third parties,

such a relation-

ship of master und servant as protected them from being
interfered with or enticed to leave lis plantation.

We

do not hold that it is necessary to sustain this action,
that there must be a written contract, or that any third pat.
party can take advantage of formal defects in one if wri.tt en.
If iunde- employment the servants are at work, any person
intruding upon the rights of the master by enticing them
away, is liable in an action of damages, and we therefore
concur with the court in
this ground"

1-efusing a new trial

sought upon

In the next case, Noice v. Brown, 39 N. J. L,

569, the seco-d coujnt was for enticing awaysa servant at
willP.O

It

wa

said,

"It

is

well settled

that a persor~who,

knowing the premises, entice's anotherv to break an existing
contract of service," is liable 'o an action for the damages
which ensue to the employer.

Whether an action will lie

where there is no binding co.,tract to continue in service
is, perliaps, not so clear, but

I think it may be maintained

both upon reason and authority, where it is merely a subsisting service at will.

Wherei~the service iv merely at

will, all the liabilities and rights existing between master
and servant attach to the relation.

.

.

.

In such service

like a tenancy at will, the relatirn must be ended in some
way,

before the rightIts of the master can be lost:"

By the

u'nwarrantable interference of a third party, the employer

71.
is deprived of what he otherwise might have retained"
Ix Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla., 206, is a well-considered case and is on all fours with Allen v. Flood, for
in this case it was the employer who was induced to break
a contract at will and discharge the plaintiff.

It was

held actionable, the court daying, "From the authorites
referred to in the last preceeding paragraph, and upon principle, it is apparent that neither the fact that the term
of service interrupted is not for a fixed period nor the
fact that therE is not a ri

ht of action against the person

who is induced or influenced to terminate the service or to
refuse to perform his agreement, is of itself not a bar to
an action against the third persnn maliciously and wantonly procuring the termination of or a refusal to perform the
agreement.

It is the legal right of the party to such

agreement to terminate it or refuse to perform it, and in
so doing he violates no right of the other party to it, but
so long as the -former is willing and veady to per-form ±±,
it is not the legal right, but is a wrong on the part of a
third party to maliciously and wantonly procire the former
to terminate or refuse to perform it.

such wanton and mal-

icious interference for tibe mere purpose of injuring another
is not the exercise of a legal riluht.

Such other person

who is in employment by which he is ea-ning a living or
otherwise enjoying the fruits and advantages of his industry
or enterprise or skill, has a right to pursue such employment undisturbed by mere malicious or wanton interference
or annoyance.

Every one has a perfect right to protect

72.
or advance his business if in

Em

doing so he infringes no

superior legal right of another"
This statement of the law is quoted with approval in
Lucke v. Cutter's &c Trimmer's Assembly, 77 Md., 396, and
Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me., 166,
two cases involving the same principle.
Steamship Co. v.
30 Mo. App.,

cKenna, 30 Fed.,

524.

See, old Dominion

48, and Lally v. Cantwell

I have been able to find ro American

case involving facts simila

o

to Allen v. Flood where the

principle has been denied.
What is the result of all these cases?
turn for a moment

Ao

our old friend tUnlawful!

Let us reI think we

can now give a more accurate definition of the word.
is an act unlawful?
prison 1?

Why

Why has A no right to assault or im-

Does it depend on the intrisic nature of the

act or does it depend on the fact that some right of B's has
been invaded?

I think it depends on the latter, in the one

case his right of personal liberty has been interfered with
and in the other that ofrpersonal security.

Isn't, there

fore, an unlawful act one that invades the right of another
and for which 'here is no legal justificationior excuse?
Some one may say that oxi-e- would be liable for naarly all of
his acts, bult this is not so.

We all know that many acts

prima facie unlawful may be justified and then what was unlawful becomes lawful.

One can justify an assault, a libel

and nearly every tort.

It strikes me that the courts have

lost a great deal of valyable time in discussing unlawful
meansthat might

'ave been saved if the-/ had looked to see

if any legal right of the plainti"f had been invaded and
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then. inquired whether there was any excuse for that invasion.
I wonder what criterion of unlawful acts the colrts used int
the first ca,-se of assault K,

imprisonment &c.

If

4hey

had argued accovding to the modern method how could it
ever have been determined that these acts were unlawful.
What means had they for determining tha+ the acts were unlawful?

It strikes me that these courts must have at

least felt, if they did not say, that some right of the
plaintiff had been invaded and therefore the acts were unlawful.

I imagine that

our ancient lawyers would have

been somewhat mistified by the modern idea of an unlawful
act.

Suppose the first case for false imprisonment had

been one where the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff
was in his (def't) house, had locked the doors and barred
the windows and the gone away and left the plaintiff to
get'out as best he might.

Now the astute lawyer for the

defense says, "Your honor, my client ?as done nothing he
hadn't a legal right to do, he had a right to lock up his
own house and bar the windows if he saw fit"; and his honor
remarks, "Why that is so, the plaintiff here has no right,
for the defend &nt has done
do"

-,othing that he couldn't legally

Isn't that a remarkable proposition?

But this is

t ie modern method of getting at an unlawful act.

It is

certainly wonderful.
As I understand the situation, it is

1,,ractically

this:

A man has a right to gain a livelihood, therefore any interference wil-h that right is unlawful, unless some excuse or
jistifiation is shown.

The whole trouble lies in looking
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at the cause and

not at the effect.

If the effect is an

injury to a right, then there is an action, whether the caus
be primarily lawful or unlawful, unless some excuse or
justification can be shown.
A very interesting question presents itself here, i.
e.,

whereAthe burden of proof lie?

of tort (assault, libel, &c.)

In the ordinary action

the plaintiff need only prove

the wrong and the defendant must Prove the justification.
In the case

f.f

a nuisance the burden is o

prove the nuisance.

the plaintiff to

Wood on Nuisances, 2 Ed.,

982.

The

rule governing the burden of proof in contributory negligence furnishes another example where the plaintiff must go
further than proving the simple w ong, he must at least
prove the absence of some of the grounds of jistification.
In other words one might say that in some torts the courts
will presume that the act wasn't justified and the burden
is on the defendmt to prove that it was; whil

in 6thers.,at

least some of the grounds of ,ustification do exist and the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove their absence.

In

which class does the action for a wrong done to the right
to gain a livelihood, tall?

The question presented itself

to me so late that I have been unable to make a careful
study of the cases on this point and therefore I only suggest it.
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GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE.
In the preceeding pages I haven't attempted to show
nor did I inteind to indicate anx of the times when an interference with the right to gain a livelihood would be justified.

I did not analyze the ces for that purpose.

I

simply analyzed them for the purpose of proving that there
was such a right and for no otler.

We muJst now consider

what tne law will KxNx±xx say is 'a lawful justification
and excuse' for meddling with another's ri' ht to gain a livelihood.

It is apparent that if all men have a right to

gain a livelihood, that frequently, when two or more persons
a"

legitimately exercising this right, thea will clash and

each must give way to the o'her in some degree.

Thus we

can see that f.here will be certain injuries which

the law

must necessarily excuse.
Before entering upon the discussion we should notice
the general principles governing the question.

A boycott

is a combination and a civil action in relation thereto,is
an action on the case in the nature of conspiracy.

There

is no action for the mere combination or conspi--acy, but
something must be done resulting in damage to the plaintiff.
Enc. of P1. & Pr.,,

739, n. 3.

The allegation of conspir-

acy is mere surplusage, acting merely as a matter of agravation.

Id.

Further "a conspiracy cannot be made the sub-

ject of a civil action, although damage result, unless something is done which without the conspiracy would give a rich
of action.

In other words an act which if done b, one

76.

alone constitutes no groundof action cannot be made the
ground of auch action by alleging it

to have been done by

and through a conspiracy of severul; that 'he true test as
whether such action will lie is whether or not tht

act ac-

complished after the conspiracy has been formed is itself
actionable, , Delz v. Winifree.

Boston V. Simmons.
J/

ney.A

Bohn Hfg. Co. v. Hollis.

Kimball v. Harmon.

I acauley v. Tier-

i ..
//
The only use of the allegation of conspiracy is that
*

/

it is important to prove it in order to get judgment against
all the defendants, but if the plaintiff can only show that
one of the defend 'nts was concerned in the act he may still
have judgment against him.

Enc. of Pl/ & Pr

7A

73 9

, n. 5.

In the Oxley Stave Co. case the court says? "We are not able
to concede, however, that it is always the case that what
one person amy do without rendering himself liable to an
action many persons may enter into a combination to do.

It

has been held in several well considered cases that the law
will sometimes take cognizance of acts done by a combination
which would not give rise to a cau se of action if committed
by a single individual, since there is a powerx in numbers,
acting in concert, to inflict injury, which does not reside
in persons acting separately"
1892 App. Cas., 24,25; i(.,

"Steamship Co. v. McGregor,

23 Q. B. D.,

598, 616:

Ar~Tur

v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A., 209, 63 Fed., 310, 3r1; and State v.
Glidden, 55 Conn., .46" are cited as the 'well-considered
cases' supporting this statement.

So far as the first

case is concerned it is simply necessary to state that no
one was held liable for anything in that case.

Judge Thay-

77.
er evidently r'ers to the dicta of Bowen, L.J., at p. 6a
..
D.
The discssionH_'_
of the

reprtof the case in 23

'B

referred to in Arthur v. Oakes begins on p. 321 and Aon p.
/3

324 with the paragraph alr-eady quoted(on p.
"it seems entilely clear"-

beginning,

The case does not sustaiy the

proposition suted by Judge KThayer.

State v. Glidden

is more dificult to explain on account of the report.
defendants demrred to the indictment.

The

The demurrer was

overruled and the defendantsAtried and convicted.

"The

evidence, which was given in full in the findings, is omitted", in the report.
shows tha

An examination of the indictment

acts were charged that were clearly sufficient

and others tha. were insufficient to constitute an offense.
It is impossible to tell what was proven.

But there are

statement in the Opinion which sustain the contention of
Judge Thayer. (p.74.)

However I think the decission real-

ly went on the grounds that il was a combination to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.

(p. 75 -

78.)

The use of the word 'malicious' in this connection
has cause( a -reat deal of trouble but its proper application is well explained by Bowen, L.J.,

in the Mogul case.

He says, "Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated
in the ordinary course of events to damage , end which does,
in fact, damage another in that otlhers person,ax property
or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.

Such intenhional action when done without just cause

or excuse is what the law calls 'malicious' wrong.

(See

Bromage V. Prosser, 4 B. & C , 247; Capital & Counties Bank
v. Fenty, pe_rLord Blackburn.)"

Of course the courts

78.
might say, we will allow all acts to be justified excert
those that are prompted by personal malice or spite, but
they hamen't drawn the line there.

See, Mooer's V.

Bricklayers Union? 23 Wk. L. Bull.,
Keeping these principles

48.

in riind

ve can proceed with

our investigation.
The bovndries of legal jostification and excuse in
these cases have not as yet been clearly defined.

The sim-

plest
case is this;oneperson wishing to harm X, refuses to
have anu business relati,-ns with him.
Does X have an action?
lute

The answer Is clearly, No.
....

...

.

..

,."

"A person has an abso-

.;..iiess
L

relations

with any

person whomsoever-, whether the refusal is based upon reason
or the result
v. Winifree.
be so,

of whim,

caprice,

prejudice,

Carew v. Rutherford.

or malice.'

Delz

This must necessarily

otherwise there would be no personal freedom.

If one person may refuse to deal wi.- h X, It follows that
seVeral may combineAtogether a-nd refuse.
of the Bohn Mfg. Co.'v.

Hollis.

This is

the case

In this case retailers

in lumber agreed not to buy of any wholsaler who sold
others than regular dealers.

to

The plaintiff (a wholesaler)

violated this provision and the retailers refused to buy
of him.

It was held, and properly, that i ere wa.3

action.

In this case

xo

"i' will be observed that defendants

were not proposing to send notices to any one but,members
of the associatioi."
Brewster v. Miller, 41 S. W.,
casey supports the same proposition.

301, a late Kentucky
In this case

the un-

79.
dertakers of Louisville agreed to refuse their services to
any one who had failed to pay :Kx
former services.

xExxixxxx

a bill for

It was held that the plaintiff, who had

fallen under this ban, had no cause of action.

The court

said, "One has the right to decline to enter into a business
undertaking
XK±H±±XX with anyone.
The law does not impose such an obligation upon any one.

This being trije, any number of

persons can enter into an agreement by which they can decline to assume business relations with or to enter into
any contract with one or more persons.

If Brewster was

indebted to Miller's Sons, then they had the right to decline to give him ani opporlunity to increase his indebtedness or refuse to furnish material for the burial of bis
wife, unless he paid the claim which Miller's Sons asserted
against him.

As those who are members of the Funeral

Director's Association, for a good reason,. or for no reason,

bu r i a 1
had the right to decline to render services or furnish"material, and, if they saw proper, to decline to render services because Miller's Sons asserted a claim against Brewster, their refusal creates no legal liability against them.
It is immaterial, so far as Brewster is concerned, as to
what reasons may have influenced them to decline employment,
or to refuse to furnish the burial material which he desired.

Miller's Sons might have asserted a claim against

Brewster which had foundation in neither morals or law, yet
if the members of the association, other than Miller's Sons
chose to be influenced by it, and to decline the employment &c.,

B'ewster has no cause of action against them"
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(See Schulten v. Brewing Co.,

96 1(y.,

Curran v. Galen,2 misc.,
a peculiar case.

224.)

553, s.c.

152 N. Y.,

33, is

It seems that the Ale Brewer's Associa-

tion of Roghester had agreea with defendants that all its
employes

"shall be members of the Brewerti Workingmen's

Local Assembly, 1796, Knights of Labor, ant that no employe
should work for a longer period than four weeks without
becoming a member"
discharged.

Plaintiff, not being a member, was

He brought anlaction agains4

the members of

the labor union who set up this agreement as a defense.
The special Term sustained a demurrer to the answer and the
Court of Appeals affirmad the decision.

There is no alle-

gation that the contract was not prefectly voluntary on the
Art of

he Brewer's Association.

So fa, as appearsfVom

the report of the case it would seem that it should be controlled by the principle of the Bohn case.

The court

seems to rest its decision on the ground that the contract
was in restraint of trade, therefore void and no defense to
the action.

In a 'Per Criam' opinion the court said,

"Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to purshai

his lawful trade

or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper, or to restrict that freedom, and, through con t racts or arrangements with employers,
to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization and to come under its rules and conditions, under
the penalty of the loss of their position, and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlaw-
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ful and militates against' the spirit of our government and
the nature of our institutions%-

The efectuation of such

a purpose woild conflict with that principle of public policy Which prohibits monopolies and exclusive priveleges.

It

would tend to deprive the prblic of the services of man in
useful employments and capacities"

In this view of the

case all the parties to the illegal combination would be
liable, the Brewer's Association as well a- the labor Union.
But as I understand the

law a contract in restraint

of tra&

is simply unenforceable between the parties ahd a third person who suffers thereby has no cause of acti n simply because the

ontract is in restraint of trade.

"No case can

be found in which it was ever held that, at common law, a
contract or agreement in general restraint of trade was actionable at the instance of thira parties, or would constitute the foundation for such an action.

The courts some-

times call such contracts 'unlawful' or 'illegal' but in
every instance it will be found that these terms were used
in the sense, merely, of 'void' or 'unenforceable' as between the parties; the law considering the disadvantages
so imposed upon the contract a0sufficient protection to the
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D.,598;

public.
1892 App.
case.

eas.,

25"

11itchell,

J.,

in the Bohn Mfgr.

Co.

See, also, Continental Ins. eo/, 9. Underwriters,

67 Fed., 310, and U. S. v. Addystone Pipe & Steel Co/, 85
Fed., 271, 279.

This is the first exception.

The second case may be illustrated as follows:suppose thatin the Bohn case the wholsalers had refused to
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sell to a non-regular dealer, bqcause of this rule of the
retailers, would this non-regualr dealer have had an action
Let us notice bbrefully the rela-

against the retailers?

tion between the parties to this combination.

We have threi

Ist. the' party threatening, 2nd. the party threatened, and
3rd.

the party intended to be injured.

It is clear that

under the first exception, the 3rd party could not have an
action against the second, nor the second against the first.
The question is, can

he 3rd party have an action against

the 1st? and if so, when?

It must be observed that in

t,'e first case, where ax combination refuses to deal with
X,

that X isireally "he third party? for each e4

of the

combination must have used some effort to obtain the consent
ofq~the others to join the combination.

Consequently we

must first notice what means may be used in forming this
If only honest and peaceable persuasion and

combination.

argument arerused to obtain +he consent to jtin this combination, then there is n:o action.
Pa. St.,

420; Bohn Mfg. Co. v.

23 Fed.,

748,

Cote v. Murphy, 159

Hollis; and U. S. v. Kane,

see quotation ofi p.

.

But suppose

a man refuse to be influenced by honest and peacaatle persuasion and argument, can you go any furhter or use other
means to obtain his consent?

Of course this gives us the

same state of affairs as was just suggested in the modification to the Bohn case, or the three party arrangement.
There are two situations that may exist which seem to control this case.

First, there may be competition between

the first and thi-d aprties, and second, thienre may be no
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competition between them.
What do we mean by competition?

Webster defines it

as "the act of seeking, or endeavoring to gain, what another
is endeavoring to gain at the same time"

There ma-, be

competition in trade, betweon rival traders.
Stabfield, 137 Ind.,

592.

Jackson

There may be competition in

labor between labor, between rival laborers.
Flood.

Y.

Allen v. f

And lastly, there may be competition between capi-

tal and labor.

xx~kxxxx±txAxzN~

Veglehan v. G~untner, 167 Mass., 92.

Y X22 xMdx~xf2xx
It is competition,

pu-e and simple, in each case, and if "all men are created
Equal", the laborer and the trader are entitled to the same
protection in their competition and no greater restraints
should be imposed on the one thah on the other.
First let us consider the cases where there is no
competition and see just what they decide.

Can the first

party use more than persuasion and argument in trying to
induce the second party not to deal with the fbktud?

It is

well settledathat if fraud, force, threats, intimidation,
coercion, libellous sta'-ements or other uilawful means are
used an action lies.
Keeble v.

Garrett v. Taylot.

Hickeringill.

M'Gawley.

Ibbotson v.Peat.

Evans v. Walton.

v. McDonough.

Tarleton v.

Guntner v. Astor.

Van Horn v. Van HorN.

Noice v. Brown.

Levet's case.

Hughes

Blumenthal v. Shaw.

But suppose means are used which,

considered in the abstract, are not unlawful, does an acti n
lie?

For instance if A says to B, if you trade with X I

won't trade with you.

In Temperton V Russell, ti-e membesr
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of a trade union threatened to withdraw from the employment
of any person who dealt with plaintiff.

In Chipley v.

Atkinson, the defendant threatened that he woild not build
a side track for the second party if he retained plaintiff
in his employment.

(He wasn't bound to butid the track.)

In Int. Nat. Fy. Co. v. Greenwood, the defendant threatened to discharge employes if they dealt with plaintiff.

In

Connell v. Stalker, the plaintiff was treasurer of a labor
union and refused to give up certain books oyi an illegal
demand made by the union.

The union men who were employed

with him, threatened to quit if plaintiff remained and he
was discharged.

In none c(f these cases, except possibly

Temperton wy. Russell, was there any pretence of competition
bet ;een the first and thtrd parties, and it is clear

U1:t

the act threatened was not in itself unlawful, but it was
held that there was an action.
said that in the eases

I thi ,ik that it may be

,'here there is no competition nothing

niore than argument and persuasion can be used to influence
the second party.

7her- are several eases which were

heard on demurrer but they help us none as to the facts.
,ytalker v. Cronin.
Pendleton.

Delz v.

Dannerburg v. Ashley.
7'inifree.

Perkins v.

In the last case the alle-

ration is "that without justifiable cause and unlawfully,
and with the malicious intent to molest, obstruct, hinder
and orevent the plaintiff from carrying on his business" &c.
The court says "Plaintiffs' petiltion goes further than to
chrge that each of tJ e defend :nts refused to sell to him.
It charges that they not only did that, but that they indu-!-
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ed a third person +-o refuse to sell to him'

It does not

appear what means were tised to induce the third Tperson but
if the word 'induced' only includes arguients and persuasions then I think the case

t
,-ong
under the rule governing

It cannot be otherwisel for in this

the first ex,.eption.

very case there were several defend-nts and some one of
them must have 'induced' the others -

the agreement could

hardly have been spontaneous - and surely the court does not
mean to say that any one bf the defend±nts would be liable
for 'inducing' some other defendant.

It seems to me that

this construction of the case reduces it to an absujrdity.
We now come to the cases where A-here is cmmpetition
between the first and third party.

Of course the ge eral

rule is that "if disturbance or loss comes fxrom :k

as a

result of competition of tlie exercise of like rights by
others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superion
right by contract or otherwise is interfered with.'
v. Cronin.

"The reason is

Walker

that free competition is

.

worth mo-e to society than it costs, and that on this groundb
the infliction of the damage is privileged"

The principle

is found in the schoolmaster's case, 11 H. IV, 47, and also
in the Miller's case, 22 H. VI.
Actions on the Case, N. c.,

14.

(See Vinier's Abr.,

11, 12, 13, 14, & 15.)

The

rule is admirably stated in Macauley v. mierney, 33 Atl,",l,
where the court says,

"

It is doubtless true, speaking gen-

erally, that no one, has a right

intentionally to do an act

with the irtent to injure another in Vis business.

Injury,

8"3.
however,

in

its

legal, sense,

means damage resulting from a

violation of a legal right.

It is this viola+ion of a

legal right which renders the act wrongful in the eye of the
law, and makes it actionable.
a ljgal excuise

for the act,

damage may result from its

If, therefore, there is

it

is

not wrongful, even though

performance.

The cause and

excuse for the sending of the notices, it is evident, was
a selfish desire of the part of the members of the

e4e

association to rid themselves of the competition of those
not members, with a view to increasing the profits of their
own business.

The qvestion then resolves itself into this:

Was the desire to free themselves from competition, a sufficient exciise,Mix in legal contemplation, for the sending of
t:e notices?

We think the

ative answer.
of trade.

uestion must receive an affirm-

Competition, it has been said, is the life

Every act done by a trader for the purpose

of diverting t-ad]e from a rival, and attracting it to himself, is an act intentionally done, and, in so far, as it
is successful, to the injury of the rival in his business,
since to that extent it lessens his gains and profits.

To

hold such an act illega. and wrongful would be to stifle
competitirn.

Trade should be free and unrestricted; and

hence every trader is left to conduct his business in his
own way, and cannot .re held accountable to a rival who
suffers a loss of profit by anything he may do, so long as
the methods he employs are not of the class of which fraud,
misrepreaentation, coercion, obstructiom, or molestation of
the rival or his servants or workmen, and the procurement
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The

of a breach of contractual relations, are instances"

coutts hhve generally recognized the rule but differ in the!
application of it to the particular case in hand.
on this ground that Allen v.

It is

Flood may be sustained.

Shand puts his judgment squarely upon this ground,

Lord

he says,

"-he case was one of competition in labor, which, in my
opinion,

is

in

al

essentials analogous

to competition in

trade, and to which, the same principles must apply.
Although it
titled

is

no doubt true that the Plaintiffs were en-

to pu.sue their trade as workmen

'without hindrance',

their right to do so was qualified by an equal rilht, and
indeed the same right, on the part of the other workmen.
It

The hindrance must not be of an unlawful character.
must not beK by an unlawful action.

Amongst the rights of

all workmen is the right of competition.

In like manner

and to the same extent as a workman has a right to pursue
his work or labor without hindrance, q trader h .s a right
to trade without hindrance.

That right is subject to the

right of others to trade also, and to subject him to competition whici is in itself lawful, and which cannot be
complained of where no unlawful means xR xxic
been employed.

.

.

.

have

The matter has been settled in so far as

competition in trade is concerned by the judgment of this
House in the Mogul Steamship Co/ case.

I can see no reason

for saying that a different principle should apply to competition in labor.

In the course of such competition, and

with a view to secure Im kimxmRf an advantage to himself, I
can find no reason, for saying that a workman is not within
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legal
his"rights

in

resolving that he will decline to work in

the

same employment with certain other persons, and in intimating that resolution to his employer"
Hawkins, J.,

(See remarks of

p. 23; Cave, J., p. 37, and Lord Herschell,

pp. 119, 140-141.)
However it

is

able competition.

evident there must be a limit to allowThe curts are not at all agreed as to

just where this limit is.
honest peaceable

Of course it may be stated that

-ersuasion and argument may be used by A

to get others to deal with him and that he may offer better
terms than any one else.
that if

"fraud,

Pogul case.)

misrepresetation,

It is also settled

intimidation,

coercion,

obstruction, molestation or other utlawful means"are used
e.ThEN

THE PRIVELEGE IS DESTROYED/

ixxkxdkxa
case.

mACAULEY V,/ TIERNEY/

b 1x:crxxnx±x t kxxx laxs
Bohn Mfgr. Co. case/

:xcxxasx..

Mogul

Robinson v. Land Ass'n.

But what is the result between these two extremes?
This is the debatable ground in this class of cases.
In Jackson v. Stanfield, "The retail Lumber Dealer's
Ass'n'. agreed not to patronize any wholsaler who sold to
consumers and brokers.

The retailers whre held liable in

an action by a broker to whom a wholsaler had refused to
sell on account of this rule of the retailers.

This case

seems to go principally on the same ground as Curran v.
Galen, (ante, p. 80) and that
timidations'.

4 here

were

'threats and in-

In Olive v. Van Patten tbe facts were

89.
similar to those of the last case.

The decision seems to

go squa-ely on the ground of interference.

The court says,

"Plaintiffs had the right to sell at wholesale or retail, or
both,

to the retail

dealer and

defendants had the same right,

to the actual consumer,
as well as the ri-h

and

to so-

licit and secure trade from plaintiff's customers by underselling them.
this,

and would

This would be legitimate.

They could do

ot be responsible for the injurious con-

sequences to the plaintiff's business; but they could not,
without wome legal purpose directly serving their own business, maliciously induce third persons not to trade with
I)laintiffs and so injure the~m:,
Co.,

In Hopkins v. Oxley Stave

the employes of plaintiff, who were members of the

defendant labor union, became dissatisfied because of the
introduction of labor saving machinery, which resulted in
the discharge of many and threatened a cut in the wages of
the rest, and struck.

The defendants notified the pa,,kers

of meat that if they used any of the machine made barrels
&c. made by

Plaintiff, that defendants' labor union and oth-

er labor unions would refuse to buy their goods.

The

defendants were held liable because "those who were engaged
in the conspiracy intended to excite the fears of all persons who were engaged in making barrels, or who handled
commoditieA packed in barrels, that, if they did not obey
the orders of the associated labor organizations, they would
incur the active hostility of those associations, suffer a
great financial loss, and possibly run the risk of sustaining, some personal injiry'

Barr Y. Trades Coujncil, in-

90.
volves the same state of facts except that it ,,,'as a printing
office instead of a coopering plant.

In regard to compe-

tition the court said, (p. 124) "1 see no similarity in the
business of the parties.

That bf the complainant is the

publisher of a ne spaper.

!hembers of the typographical

union and stereotypers' and pressmens' union are skilled
workmen, whose services might be employed in such business,
but they are ':ot carrying on any enterprise in competition
that
If this isn't competition between
with"of the oomplainant7'*
capita-Tn-Jabor, what is?---The employer seeking to introduce new conditions that will affect the wages of the
working men, and 'the employes resisting.

Would the court

have us believe that thate can be no competition between
capital and labor.

Theft the; e can JIhe competition only

between traders or between laborers.

According to this

theory the Brewer's Ass'n. should have been held liable in
Cu-ran v. Galei; and the Labor Union not liable, for the
plaintiff and the labor inion were both engaged in the same
enterprise

(seeking for work) and the Brewer's Ass'n and

the plaintiff were not/ (one owned the brewery and the other
worked in it.)

I am very much afraid that I don't know

just what competifion means.

Does it necessarily follow

that persoens must be engaged in the same
there may be competition?

'enterprise' that

But if this proposition is true,

are not the pa-ties to this controversy engaged in the same
nterprise'?

One is seeking to maintain his wages and

hours of labor by resisting the use of labor saving machinery and t1he other to reduce wages and hours of labor by
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using this machinery.

Isn'T this competition?

ever, the decision seems to go on the ground that
be no -reas(;nable dispute

How"tere

can

the whole proceeding or boy-

th-

cott in this controversy is to force Mr. Barr, by fear of
loss -o

bu__isiness,

to conduct

to his own judgment,

but in

that iusiness,

not according

accordance with the determin-

ation of the typographical union, and, so

far as he is con-

cerned, it is an attempt to intimidate and coerce"
Lucke v. Cutters & Trimmers, the defendants
members of a labor union.

In

(tailors) were

The defeddant was a tailor and

not a member of the union.

The defendants secured his

discharge by threatening to withdraw their patroaage from
the employed.

The court seems to have held that there was

no competition in this case for it is said "the testimony
in this

:.ase assigns no other motive, (to procure plaintiffs

discharge) and there is not the slightest intimation from
any source that there is any."

Yet it appears that there

were "many union men ou • of employment"
Co. v.

In Steamship

McKenna, there was a strike of longshoremen and

defendants, dffiuers of the labor union, "endeavored to stop
all dealing of other lersons wit.1

the plaintiff,

by wending

threatening notices or messages to its various customers
and patrons

.

.

.

designed to intimidate them from having

any dealing -ith it, through threats of loss and expenxe
in case they dealt with plantiff.

.

..

and various per-

sons were deterred from dealing with the plaintiff in consequence of sujch intimidations"

The court says they did this

92
"without any legal justifici.tion,

.

a mere dis-

.

pute about wages, the merits of which are not stated,
not being any legal justification"
b

w<lgr'

4

If a dispulte hbout

33a employer and employe isn't competition

and -t le-al justifica-4 on then I am unable

to imagine

what Ynar be.
These are the case apparently holding that more than
argument and persuasion cannot

be

A great deal was said in

tition.

and intiinida i m1.s' , "bvt in

uised in

cases of ommpe-

the cases about

'threats

law as well as mathcrx tLes,

it

simplifies things very mvsh to reduce them to their lowest
terms", and when th/is is done we find that the only threat
was to terrain from having business intercourse with those
who dealt wih plaintiff.
Let us look ut the cases on the other side of the
qiestien.

In

the Mogul case the defendants,

besides offer-

inglower rates, "refused to accept cargoes from shippers
except upon the terms that the shippers shoiid not ship an,
cargoes by the plaintiff's steamers " they also prevented
persons who were acting as their agents from acting as the
agent of the plaintijf.

But the acts were

held within

justifiable competition.

In Gauthier v. Perrault, 6 Que.

(Q. B.)

mambers of a trade union,

65,

the de:'endants,

threatened to strike if plaintiff was not discharged.
Plaintiff was a member of another union.

The, did quit

and when plaintiff was discharged they resumed work.
court held that the case was governed by the Mogul case,
saying, "Certaines remarqiles des Lords du conseil prive

The

93.
peuvent s'appliquer a la presente cause.
bury remarq;e

que la competitirn,

rival, est chose permis

Ansi Lord Hals-

dans le 7ut de chasser un

dans le commerce"

In Clemmitt

v. Watson, 14 Ind. App., 38, the facts were the same as the
last case.

A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was rever-

sed becau ,e the various charges of the court "do not require
t~he existance

of malice,

threa's,

intimidation or violence.

Under these instructions nothing more is neces:iary
than a mere agreement among themselves to quit if appellee
(pl'2lf) was -'etained and a quitting upon the employers refusal to disebarge."'
the defen:.;dant board of
aticn to regulate

In Cont. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters,
indervlriters entered into a combin-

insurance rates &c.

and agreed to have no

intercourse withnon-msmbers nor to employ any agent who represented

u non-memjer,

and threatened t

e assiir4ds of

plaintiff (a non-member) "with a boycott in case they continue their patronage of plaintiff"

Judge McKenna held

that this did not exceed the bounds of allowable competition.
In Maaauley v. Tierney the National Ass'n of Master Plumbers
agreed to withdraw their patronage from any dealer selling
supplies

.o others 'han master plumbers.

be allowable coripetition.

This was held to

(See quotation p. 85.)

Cote

v. Murphy and Buchanan v. Keer grer out of the same trouible.
In these cases the employes of the various trade
"demanded an eight

inions,

Iour day, with no -eduction in wages'

The employers refussed to grant this demand and the employes strock.

The defendants, aertaJ.n of t'e employers,

agreed not to furnis.-h material to any one w',o granted the

941.
requast.

The plaintiff granted the request and the defen-

dants refused to supply him with any material and wrote to
a dealer who sol. to plaintiff, that "it would be to his
advantage to discontinue" supplying plaintiff with material.
This dealer therefore refused to supply plainti.ff with any
more material.
tion.

It was held that there was no cause of ac-

The court in Cote v. Murphy saying, "The combina-

tion of the employers then, was not to interfere with the
price of labor as determined by the common law theory, but
to defend themselves against a demand made altogether regardless of the price, as regulated by the supply,

. . .

Nor does the fact that the appellee was not a workman or a
member of any of the unions of workmen, put him in any better attitude than if he were.

He undertook for his own

profit to aid the cause of t-1e workmen; his right so to do
was unquestionable,.

But, if the employers by a lawful

combination could limit his ability so to do, they did not
make thamselves answerable in damages to him for t?.e consequences of a lawful act!

In discussing threats &c.,

the

court said, "The threats referred to, although they are
usually termed threats, were not so in a legal sense.

To

have sAid they would inflict bodily harm on other dealers,
or vilify them in the newspapers, or bring on them social
ostracism, or similar declarations, these the law would
have deemed threats, for they may deter a man of ordinary
courage fVom the prosecution of his business in a way which
accords with '-is own notions; but to say, and even that is
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inferential from t:2e correspondence, that if they continued
to sell to plaintiff, the membersp of tle association would
not buy from them, is not a threat.

It does not interfere

with the dealers free choice; it may have prompted him to a
somewha$ sordid calculation; he may have considered which
custom was most profitable, and have acted accordingly but
this was not such coercion and threats as constituted the
acts of the combination unlawful"

This case is on all

fours with Barr v. Essex Trades Council and the Stave Co.
case except that in this case the threat was made by the
employer and not by the employe.
In Robinson v. Pine Land Ass'n the plaintiff and defendant owned stores, both selling the same kind of goods.
Defendant threatened to discharge his employes if they
traded with plaintiff.

This conduct was held not actionable.

"If the defendant could so control its employes as to prevent their dealing with plaintiff, or so control their wages
as to divert them from the channels of plaintiff's business
in favor of its own, we know of no rule making it actionable
In Sinsheimer v. Garment Workers, adispute arose between plaintiff and defendant "caused by the fact that the
piaintiff has discriminated against the members of this
voluntary ass'n (0'fr) in the employment of labor necessary
to carry on its business.

...

While this dispute

continued, the defendants sent circulars to the plaintiff's
customers, which were clearly intended as a threat to such
customers, that, in case such customers continued to do
business with the plaintiff, the defendants would notify
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other trade unions to withhold their business from any firm
that continued to sell the plaintiff's goods, and the uvidence show4

that,

in consequence of such circulars, pur-

chasesi of goods from plaintiff, were cancelled by their
customers, and statements were made b., other customers that,
unless plaintiff settled his dispute with the defendants,
future business would be discontinued"
Term)Van Brunti

P. J.,

In the General

said "I fail to see that there is

any infringement of any provision of law in the issuance of
such a circular."

The judgment was reversed and the in-

junction dissolved.
In Bowen v. Matheson the defend-,nts, keepefs of seamens boarding

houses, combined to control the business of

the shipping mastersof Boston, by (among other things) using
"our best endeavors to prevent our boadders shipping in any
vessel where any of the crew are shipped from boarding houses that are not in good standing"

Plaintiff was a non-

member, and defendants notified "the public that they had
laid him on the shelf, and notified his customers and friend
that he c aldship

xx

to the declaration ..

mzx,

seamen for them"&C.

A demurrer

"he wag sustained.

The

court said, "If their effect is to destrpy the business of
shipping masters who are not members of the association,
it is such a result as in the competition of business often
follows from a course of proceeding that t-he law permits.
. . .

As the declaration sets forth no illegal acts on the

part oC the defendants, the demuTrer must be sustained"

97.
Snow v. Wheeler was an action to recover money from
defendants who held it as trustee of the trade union which
plaintiff reRresents.
the union wa-3
recover.

The defense was that the object of

illegal and therefore the plaintiff could not

The union was formed "for the purpose of protect-

ing themselves against the 'encroachments' of their employers, and to agree in furtherance of such object not to teach
others thetr trade unless hy consent of the society'
court said,

The

"It is insisted that the agreements thus estab-

lished between the members of the order are in unlawful
restraint of trade, and therefore illegal, as against public
policy.

But in the opinion of the court the point is not

well taken.

kIn the relations existing between xx±±K±

labor and capital, the attempt by co-operation on the one
side to increase wages by diminishing competition, or on the
other to increase thp profits due to capital, is within
certain limits lawful and proper.

It ceases to be so when

unlawful coercion is employed to control the freedom of the
individual in disposing of his labor or capital?
See Parker v. Bricklayers Undon, 21 Wk. L. Bull., 223
and Lord Shand in Allen v. Flood, ante p.

SL

It seems to me that this is the true ground of the
decision in Keeble V. Hickeringill.

There is certainly

nothing unlawful in firing guns into the air, but it is a
"violent' and not a 'peaceable' interference with a man's
right to gain a livelihood in a case where there was no
competition.

V

is for this reason that Keeble v. Hicker-

ingill is right and Carrington v. Taylor is wrong.

(Hawkins

98.

J.,

p. 20.)
Which of these rules just discussed is the soundest

I do not undettake to decide but in solving the propo:;ition
it would be well to notice the law governing strikes.

We

can now see the general principles that underlie that subject.

One man or a body of men can agree not to work for

another and the employer can have no
comes under the first exception.

action.

This claarly

Generally the reason for

their so doing was some disagreement about wages or some
matter connected with the work.
tween capital and labor.

This was competition be-

The courts have certainly hald

that the strikers must only stop at the use of unlawful (?)
means in inducing laborers not to enter the employment of
the plaintiffs.

It seems to me that the general principles

of both strikes and boycotts a'e the same.
In a discussio
L. J.,

390.)

of the Oxley Stave Co. case (56 Alb.

it was said, "The gist of a boycott, however,

is to draw utterly disinterested

mxxmxooutsiders into a

controversy, for the sake of compelling a recalcitrant
employer to yield, through making life generally miserable
or the transaction of any business i-mpossible.

There

could, of course, be no limit in principle to the-extension
of the circumference of the boycott circle.

A dispute

between an4 employer and its employes in one small locality
might be made to cripple or demoralize business in remote
places, and among persons who had no knowledge of what the
original difficulty was about, and had never heard of the
original parties"

In other words, we are to believe that

99.
competition between capital and labor is unreasonable because it affects "disinterested outsiders" and is therefore
unlawful.

We may have competition between capitalists or

between laborers, but competition between capitalist and
laborer, never.

In the Mogul case Lord Bowen, made a

few remarks that are very pertinent to the issue raised by
this criticism.

"We were told'

he said, "that competi-

tion ceases to be the lawful exercise of trade, and so to
be a lawful excuse for what will harm ahother, if carried to
a lenglit which is not fair or reasonable.

The offering

of reduced rates by the defendants in the present case is
said to have been 'unfair'.

This seems to assume that,

apart from fraud, intimidation, iolestation or obstruction,
of some other personal right in rem or personam, there is
some4natural standard of 'fairness' or 'unreasonableness'
("

be determined by the internal consciousness of the judges

and juries),beyond which competition ought not in law to go.
There seems to be no authorityj

and I think, with submission,

that trere is no suff'icient reason for such a proposition.
It would impose a novel fetter upon trade.,

The defendants

we are told by the plaintiffs' counsel, might lawfully lower
v-'

~s providedithey did not lower them beyond a 'fair fxxtgk

freight', whatever that may mean.

But Wkere is it extab-

lished that there is any such restriction upon commerce? And
what is to be the definition of a 'fair freight'?

It is

said that it ought to ije a normal rate of freight, such-as
is reasonabl7F'remunerative to the ship owner.

But over"

100.
what period of time is the average of this reasonable remunerativeness

to be calculated?

All commfercial men with

capital are acquainted with the ordinary expedient of sowing
one year a crop of apparently unfruitful pp'ices,

in order

by driving competition away, to reap a fuller harvest of
in
profit"the future; and until the present argument at the
bar it may be doubted whether shipowners or merchants were
ever deemed to be bound by law to wonform to some imaginary
'normal' standard of freight or prices, or that law courts
had a right to

say to them in respect bf their competitive
far shalt thou go al-cd no further'.

tariffs,""hus

To at-

tempt to limit English competition in this way would Imktkx
±nfxx probably be as hopeless an endeav.or as the experiment
of King Canute.

But on ordinary principles of law no such

fetter on freedom of trade can in my opinion be warranted.
A man is bound not to use
upon another's rightx.
laudas.

is prbperty so as to infringe
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non

If engaged in actions which may involve danger

to others, he ought, speaking generally,
care to avoid endangering them.

.o take reasonable

But there is surely no

doctrine of law which compels him to use his property in a
way that judges and juries may consider reasonable.
Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. C.,

349.

See

If there is no

such fetter upon the use of prd)perty known to the English
|law, why should there be any such a fetter upon a trade?"
The question may also well be asked,"Why is such a fetter
placed upon competition between capital and labor"?

I#
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there is competition how can you stop its being carried to
the

bitter end' in one case and not in the other?

men 'created equal'?
y6

It seems to depend altogetha-

Are all
r -1or

iappen to be competing with.
In the cases cited on lagal justifi,%!ation and excuse,

I don't mean to say that the decission has always gone on
the grounds I have indicated as matters which will or will
not excuse; 1 simply mean to say that I thin, that a careful
analysis of the facts of each case will bear

out the pro-

positions I have stated.
There is another class of cases where several

Amer-

ican authorities have allowed the interference to be justified.

A & B enter a contract terminable at the will of

either party.

r

A)J Intending to injure X4 threatens to

break the contract if B has any business relations withA.
Does 'have an action against A if B refuses to deal with him?
It is held that he has none in Heywood V. Tillson, Payne v.
Ry. Co.,

and Raycroft V/ Tayntor.

They say that defendant

is only doing what he had a legal right to do and therefore
cannot be held liable.

So it is lawful for A to build a

slaughter house on his own land, if it happen that his land
is so situated that the property rights of no one else are
injured; and that is peculiarly the question in this case.
Not

was any right of B's injured but was any right of X's

invaded?

His right to gain a livelihood is certainly

invaded, now will the law excuse the act unde- the circumstances?,

In Ry. Co. v. Greenwood the defendant threatened
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to discharge its employes if they patronized the plaintiff's
otel.

"The appellant (de'ft.

contends that the petition

fails to state a cause of action; because
the facts alleged, appellant had the right

(becond) under
'to prohibit its

employes or servan t s from attending any place of resort,
such as a saloon and boarding house combi.ned, under penalty
of being discharged', and therefore did no wrong to appellek
The court said, "Were the acts the doing of which appellant
declared to its servants should be the cause of their discharge, such as would justify the action which wa
ed? . . .

threaten-

The~employes, presumabli, had the right to eat

and drink where they cho4e, so long as they violated no
contract with their employer and performed their, service
well, and the malicious use of such moral coercion upon them
by the appellant as this petition alleges, for the purpose
of injuring appellee, was wrongful, and made appellant liable for such damages as was thereby inflicted.

Appellee

did not have the richt to intentionally induce others to
abstain from patronizing appellee, except for a legitimate
purpose.

. .

According to tke allegations, it did, by

threats, of unlawful discharge, caiuse their servants to
withdraw their patronage, with intent to injure appellee.
This was not the exercise of a legal right, as contanded and
the second proposition of the appellee cannot be sustained7
See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Freeman, in Payne
v. Ry. Co. where he says, "The rule I have maintained is in
strict accord

with a maxim of the law, so well founded in

reason as to need no argument or auithority to support it,
that is,

that a man must so use his own as not to do an

injury to others.

That this means he shall so enjoy his

legal rights as not to do a wrong to the legal rights of
another, I freely concede.

But here is a use of a legal

right to discharge employes, for the directp urpose and with
no other, and for no other reason except to prevent their
trading with a party legitimately entitled by his location
and the character of his business to such trade.

Here

is the use of a legal right, iV deprive the other of that
which is his legal right, to-wit, the property he has in
the good will of his business....

por a party who has

the power, to use that power, to destroy or injure tha
value of this property, in the exercise of a right, not for
any reason of advantage to himself, but solely to injure
another, ought not to be permitted by an enlightened system
of jurisprudence in this country.
The fallacy of the position maintained by these cases
is clearly pointe6 out in the portion of, the opinion of
Chipley v. Atkinson quoted with approval in Raycroft v.
Tayntor.

It is as fdllows, "Where one does an act which

is legal in itself, and which violates no right of another
person, it is true that the fact that the act is done from
malice or other bad motive toward another, does not give the
latter a right of action against the former.

Though there

be loss or dakage resulting to the other from the act and
the doer was prompted to it solely b, malice, yet if the
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act be legal and violates no legal right of the other person
there is no right of action.

It must be admitted that in

these cases Lhe act is prima facie lawful but if we have
tried to prove one thing move than another in this thesis,
it is, that these acts do viblate a legal right of the
other person, i.e.,

the right to gain a livelihood.

The true rule governing these cases is the one!kH
governing competition as heretofore discussed.
son v. Land Ass'n, ante p. .&;
p.

?9_; and Clemmitt v.

See, Robin-

Gauthier v. Perrault, ante

Watson, ante P.

?,Y

Tillson may also be justified on another ground.
Graham v. Ry. Co.,

±xx

Heywood v.
Post p./Lj.

is governed by the provisions of the La.

code, but supports the proposition contended for.
The grounds of justification and excuse pointed out
are the ones that seem to be quite well settled by the authorities.
others.

However some of the cases seem to indicate
In Heywood v. TILLson, the plaintiff had been inWy

terfering with defendants business and was practivally seeking to ruin it, and defendant, not wishing to have his employes influenced by the plaintiff, threatenbd to discharge
any employe who occupied plaintiff's house. At page 231 the
court says, "Thre defendant was doing a large business,
having

five or six hundred men in his employ.

It was of

the utmost importance to his success that his employes slhout
be of good habits, friendly to his enterprise and interested
i

his prosperity?

Protection of business is the grounds

on which this case should be sustained, rather than those
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already indicated.

For example the employer

may re-

quire that his employes be Semperate, or, as in this case
that the employe shall not associate with one whosi
ests are inimical to those of the employer.

inter-

It seem clear

that these acts should be justified.
In Van Horn v. Van Horn, another ground of justificati(-n is pointed out by the court.

It is said, "As to

the question of privelege, the trial court chargea the jury
that a man has a right to inquire of his neighborx into the
circumstances of a Ierson to whom he is giving credit, and
that person may

on such occasions communic-ate freely, and

unless his communication be of facts which he does not honestly believe or the communication be such as was made not
for the honest rurpose of conveying the information to the
inquirer, but such as in the judgment of the jury, uhder
the evidence, shows that the defendant took advantage of
that privelege to gratify a malicious purpose, no action
will lie'.

This is a correct ptatement of the law".

There may be other grounds of excuse which the courts
will find it necessary to allow when they are presented to
them for adjudication, but I have noticed no others in the
cases as I have read them.
we have only intended to
In t.e foregoing discussion
/
discuss the law whero therewas no existing obligation bet*wen the second and third party, in other words an interference with the right to enter, into future relations.

Is

the law the same where there is an existing obligation wjich
is interfered with?

Itthink not.

In

rhan, of the cases
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touching this qluestion unlawful means were clearly used? but
where no unlawful means were used do rhe grounds of jostification vest on competition?

From an examination

facts of tbe following cases there seems to have

been no

competition, and no unlawful means were used, but
fendant was held liable.
Morgan v.

Andrews,

76 N. C.,

355.

ly show that

Forbes v. Morse,

107 I[ich.,

33;

and

the de-

69 Vt.,

Jo!es v.

The facts of the following;

of the

220;

Stanley,
cases clear-

there was competition, and that defendant used

no unlawful means, still the defendant was held liable?ixby v. Dunlop, 56 N. F.,
SI WK. L. Bull.,
297;

456; Parker v. Bricklayers Union,

223, 226; Daniel V. Swearengen, 6 S. C.,

and Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory &c.,

Nor should the law be the same.

1896, 1 Q. B.,147

To begin wih there exists

.omething which ev, ry one may strive to get by honest competition, buit after one person has succe-ded
this thing and

reducing it to possession

(one might say) for

a definite period, by means of a contract,
a

in capturing

then no one has

right to disturb that possession simply because he wants

the same thing.

He has had his day and has lost.

Let

him be content.
Many

of the courts say there is no distinction be-

tween time contracts and mere contract at will, but with one
exception (Salter v. Howard, 43 Ra.,

601,)

a careful analy-

sis off the facts will show that the true rule is that laid
down by lord Shand in Allen v. flood, namely, competition.
(The cases involving these facts have been discussed, supra,
wilh others touching the principle of competition.)

And
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why should the rule be different?

In this case the possess.

ion is not obtained for a definite time but only for the

time being and every one skould be allowed to compete for
its future possession.
Briefly stated I would sumarize the law on this
question as follows: (1) One person or a combination

of

persons may refuse to have any business A with X and he has
no cause of action; (2) Peaceable argument may always be
used to get thtrd parties to join this combination; (3) If
the third parties refuse to yield to argument, then the
bringing of any pressure to bear on them, makes the party
so doing liable where there is no competition;

(4) where L-I-

there is sompetition and the third partyl refuses to yield
to arg,ment, then any further means which stop srort of unlawful acts may be used to compel them to refrain from
dealing with X.

When I use the word 'unlawful' in this

connection I/give it its modern meaning.
I here end my discussion of this vexed question.
has sometimes been hard for me to tell ji st where I was at
(perhaps others will experience the same difficulty when
reading this thesis) But my; final conclusions are stated
and I rest in peace.

It

10

J.

PROVINCE OF EQUITY IN BOYCOTTS.
We have no* come to the point where it is

.ossible

to enquire when equity will intervene in boycotts.

Of

course inlthosex cases where the act is allowed to be justified an injunction will necessarily be refused.
Bohn ifg. Co. v. Hollis.
v. Underwriters.
justifiable,

Cote v. Murphy.

v.

Day,

M. & G.,

Cont. Ins. Co.

But where it is held tt.at the act is on-

will equity intervene?

The jurisdiction uf

equity to protect property is undoubteo.
tria

Moiul case,

3 D.

F.

& J.,

Emperor of Aus-

317; Atty-Gen.

v.

Gas Co.,

3 D.

304; and Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley.

The

propcrty which is sought to be protected in these cases is
not visible or tangible but invisible and intangible.

The

question naturally presents itself, will equity lend its
aid to the protection of such property or will it confine
its sphere of protection to corporeal property.
Bros. v. Evans,

18 Pitts.

L.

J.,

(N.

S.)

399,

In Brace

the court

said, "But it is claimed that the plAintiff's right to condilct their business is personal, and that equity will not
interfere for th-e protection of mere personal rights, but
only to preserve rights of property.
"The kanguage of our own Act of Assembly woiild seem
to include every possible right of individuals,

out it

must

be construed in reference to the regognized power of courts
of chancery, and also with reference to
own constttution which provides that
jury shall be -as heretofore,
inviolate'.

he clause of our

'e

and the right

right of trial by
thereof remain

The cou --s have heretofore been careful not
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to extend their equitable powerx so as to infringe upon the
vight of trial by jury further than is becessary for the
preservation of other rights equally sacred.
"It
liberty

...

is difficult to see why the rights of life and

(which include

the right to provide a living for

ones self and family by any

=mx

lawful means),

and the

right of acquiring property, s ould not be protected as fully
as the less important right of possessing property.

It can

not be that the strong arm of chancery can be successfully
invoked to preserve the accumulations of the rich, and is
powerless to protect the capital of the poor, his brain and
muscle and power and will to work when and as

ie pleases.

This is, in a legal sense, property; it belongs to each man
exilusively, and withi
all.

the mass of 'he community it is their

It is entitled to +'e protection of

,he law, and none

is more interested in the assertion of this powerx than the
defendants as representatives of organized labor.
"The protec4irn of trade-marks, liter

work and good

will, cannot be justified -pon any x:kKx grrxn

theory other

than that a man has a right of property in the labor of his
hands and brains.

It is therefore clear that the plaintir

being in the lawful exercise of a lawful right, should be
permitted to conduct their business as heretofore, without
molesta* ion from anyone"
certainly correct.

This statement of t.Qe law is

The courts have Rixxx never re used

to protect property because it was incorporeal.

In Emp. of

Aostriav. Day the defendants were enjoined from issuing and

1i0.
circulating sprious bank notes in Auistria.

The couirt said

"That the eflett of this int-roduction will be to disturb
the circnulation of

he kingdom cannot in my opinion be doubt-

ed, and what will be the efflct of that disturbance?

Sure-

ly to endanger, to prejudice, and to deteriorate the value
of the existing circulating medium, and thus to affect directly all the holders of Austrian bank note.s,

and indirect-

ly, if not directly, all the holders of property in the Stae,
*

.

.

I agree that the jurisdiction of this court in a case

of this na -ore -ests
spective,

and that

upon injury to property,

this

actual

or pro-

ats no jurisdi(ction to prevent

th-e commission of acts which are merely criminal or merely
illegal,

and do not affect any rights of property,

but I

think there aree hiere rights of property quite sufficient to
found the jurisdaction of thts court"
We have seen the same property protected in the striMcases.

T1he jurisdiction of equity

attacked on this ground.
to protect
prevent

property,

cannot be succe:sfully

The jurisdiction of equity being

"Equity will interfere by injunction to

(1) an injury which threatens i-reparable damage,

or (2) a continuing injury where the legal remedy therefor
may involve a multillivity of suits.
established and unquestionable.

This jurisdiction is

In practice, the criter-

ion of its application is the inadequacy of the legal remedy
depending on whether (1) 'the injury done or threatened is
of such- a natlre tha- when accomplished, the property cannot be restveto its original condition, or cannot be
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replaced by means of compensation in money';

(2) whether f-u

full compensation for thie entire wrong can be obt:iined without resort to a number of suits.
1338, 1346, 1357"

3 Por.

Eq. Jur.,

Barr v. Trades Council.

sec.

See the fol-

lowing cases where an injunction was granted.

Casey v.

Typographical Union.

Veglehan v.

Guntner.

Hopkins v. Stave Co.

Jackson v. Stanfield.

Brace Bros. V/ Evans.

Temperton v. Russell.
In Long shore Printing v. Howell, the court recognized the rule but refused to apply it to the case, saying

"T6-

showing of plaintiff is clearly ins-sufficient to bring itself wit hin the rule thus explicitly stated by the learned
Judge,

(Baldwin J.,

in Bonaparte v. Ry. Co.,

The plaintiff may have its actioyr

1 Baldw. 205).

at law against defendants

for some of the acts compliined of, and defend nts or some
of them may have by tX1ir condu'L;c

1iiisaelves

to

a criminal prosecution under the statute, and the plaintiff
may have been much annoyed, and at times seriously harrase4
by defendants; yet one thing is clear, there is no such pertistent, aggresive and virulent boycott now in progress,
nor was there St the time of the commencement of this suit,
as to jus'4 ify the court in saying that plaintiff's business
and property is being, or is about to be irreparably injured.

,re do not say that an injunction is an improper or
/

unavailable remedy to stay the desiructive and pzenicious
ravages of a boycott, but that in this particular case
plaintiff has not bromght itself within the rules of that
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particular jurisdiction of equity"
zm

an extreme

This case is certainly

one and would not be generally followed.

Nor shouid it be, for it is evident that where the parties go
beyond their legal rights,

t;-e injury to another's riht

gain a livelihood is in its very nature irreparable and
should be enjoined.

to

B L A C K L I S T I N ,.
"A blacklist is defined to be 'a list of persons
special
marked out for"avoidance, antagonism cr enmity on the tart
of those who prepare t'e list or those among whom it is intended to circulate; as where a trades union blacklists
workmen who refuse to conform to lts rules, etc.

It is

sometimes used by strikers against citizens to deter them
from continuing dealing with the part, or parties struck
against, but it is most usually resorted to by combined emplayers, who exchange lists of their employes who go on
strikes with the agreement that none of them will employ the
workmen whose names are on the list"
293.

Cogley on Strikes,

It will be seen t-at this is only one method of

conducting a boycoot and should therefore be governed by
the same rules.
Mattison v.

Ry Co.,

Blacklisting was held to be unlawful in
2 TTisi Prius

would seem to bring

276, where the facts

he case directly within the principle

of the Bohn Mfg. Co. case.
it has bee. held that ther
lar to the last case.

(0.)

In two cases in the U. S. C. C.
wa::. no action under facts simi-

McDonald v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., and

the Ketcham case, uinreported, See 57 Alb. L. J.,
In Worthington against Waring, 157 Mass.,
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421, on a

simijlar state of facts an injunction was refused apparently
on statutory grounds.
In Trollope v. Trades Federation, 72 L. T. R. (N.S.),
342, an injunction was granted in favor of an employer again
st a labor union, restraining them from publishing a black-
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list of certain employes of his.

The court distinguishes

the principle case from Jenkinsoyi v. Ieild, 8,T. L. R.,
which was an action for damages.

540,

These are all the cases

I have been able to find on this subject.

None of them

are at all satisfactory so far as they attempt to state the
law governing the

vpestion.

INTERSTAr7E C0.!UV'JRCE ACT.
Act

of Congress,

115.

Feb.

1, 1887, c. 104;
24 stat. at L. 379.

ti

"

"

Mch. 2, 1889, C. 382;
25 Stat. at L. 855.

"

"

"

Feb. 10,

'91, C. 128;
26 Stat. at L.

743.

A few peculiar phases are added to the law of boycotts by the Interstate Commerce Act.
sec.3reads as follows,

Paragraph 2 of

"Every common carrier subject

to the

provisio'Aof this act shall, according to their resepective
powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities
for the

interchange of traffic, between their respective

lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering
of passengers, and property to and from their several lines
and

those con-necting therewith, and

shall not discriminate

in their rates and charges between such connecting line-"
Unde-

t e provisions

of this act oneRy. Co. was enjoined

from refusing to receive interstate freight from anot,.er Ry.
co. in Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Burlin-ton ,?c.
Fed.,

381.

Ry. Co.,

34

The engineers on the pla-nti, f's line had

gone out on a strike and tl:e engineers

on defendant's road

threatened to strike also if any freight was accepted from
the plaintiff road.
what shall be

obeyed,-

Judge Love said,

"Now the question is,

tre law of the land,

the cheLfs of the locomotive engineers?
company refi'se obedience

of the order of

Shall a railway

to the express provisions of the

statultery law because some of its employes thre'aten to quit
its eervice, and thu s stop the 'inning of its trains?
*he court presume that they will carry out siic'

Shall

threats, and

deny relief to the complainant upo.! that presumption?

TUl
o
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temporary inconveniences to the defendtnt
public whom it serves
to be compared with

are,

in

the fatal

company, or the

my judgnent,

for one mement

consequences

whic-

from a precedent by which it wouid be established
Co. may, in violation of the law of the land,

aist insue
*hat a Ry.

refuse to

receive and haul the cars of a connecting line, at

the com-

mand of any irresponsible persons, or from its own belief
and apprehension, that its employes will
and

stop the opera'ion of its lines.

this is wholly

Isuch an excuse as

in &dmisible, aid it must be set aside"

Toledo &c Co. v. Penn. Co.,
a different phase of the question.
tion was granrte

leave its service,

54 Fed.,

730, presents

Imnthis case an injunc-

agZ,±nst 'he defendAmt under circumstances

similar to those of t'-.e preceding case.

Then a supple-

mental bill was filed making P. M. Arthur, the chef executive of the B.

of L. E.,

injunction restraining

a defendant, and asking for an

him "from issuing,

promulgating,

or

continuing in force any rule or order of sAid brotherhood,
which shall require or command any employe of any of defendant railway companies herein to refuse to handle and deliver any cars or freight in course of transportation from
one state to another to the complainant,

or from refusing

to receive and handle cars of such freight which have been
hauled over compla rant's :'oad;

and also from in any way,

directly or indirectly, endeavoring to persuade any

of t:%e

employes of the defendmt railway companies whose lines conrailway
nect wish the t
of Iki
complainant, not to extend to said
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company the

same facilities for

.nterchange of interstate

traffic as areextended by said company to othe' railway
companies"
of L. E.,

The rule referred to was rule No. 12, of the B.
which reads as follows:-

"Twelth, That hereafter,

when an issie has been sustained by the g-'and
carried into effect by the B.
nized a-s

a violation

of L.E.,

chef, and

it shall be recog-

of obligal-ion for a member

of the

Brotherdood of Locomotive Engineers Association who may be
employed on a railroad running in connection with or adjacent

to said road, to liandle the property belonging to said

railroad or system in any

Tray thit may benefit said company

/ of L.E. is at issue until the greviance or
in which the B,'

issue of whatever nat-ire or kind has been amicably settled.
In restraining Arthur from ordering the enforcement
of this rule,

the court said,

"Tt will be convenient,

in

discussing tke question whether any relief can properly be
given to complainant against Arthur, to consider rule 12
and the acts done, or to be done, in pursuance
Wirst, in the light of the criminal law;
ence to

thereof-or,

second, with refer-

their character as civil wrongs; and, third, with

reference to the remedies which a court of equity may afford
against

them. O
"l. The

,

complainant and defendant

common carriers, subject to
state commerce att,

companies are

the provisions

of the

and the business exchanged

inter-

4 -etween

them

is averred by the bill to be nearly all interstate freight.
The second paragraph of the third sectirr

of the act pro-
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rides that:-

(See ante p. 115.)

In view of the foregoing section it needs no argument to demonstrate that one common carrier is expressly
reqpired by the interstate commerce act to freely interchange interstate freight with

nother when their lines con-

nect.
Section 1O of the act, as amended, (25 Stat. at Large
p. 855.) provides that:Any common carrier subject

to the provisions of this

act, or when such comnon carrier is a corporation, any dior officer
rector"thereof, or any receiver, trustee or lessee, agent,
or person acting for or employed by such corporation, who
alone

or with any other corporation, company, person or

party,

shall willfully omit or fail to do any act,

.'.

matter, or thing in this respect required to be done, or
shall cause or willfully suffer or permit any act, matter
or thing, so directed or required by this act to bma1i

be

done, not to be done, or shall aid or abet such omission or
failure,

.

.

shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanorV.

By the foregoing sections, a common carrier which is
not a corporation is made liable criminally for viblations
of the interstate commerce law.
a corrora 4-on
b't its

But when the carrier is

and violates the law, not the corporation,

officers,

agents and persons acting for or employed

by Ot who willfully do the wvongfujl work, are made liable.
In Re Peasley, 44 Fed.,
illy

271.

liable under sectio:

S.

The corporation is made civAs every lovomotive engineer
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of the defendant companies is a person employed by' a common
carrier corporation subject to the provisions of the interstate law, he is guilty of the offense described, and subject to the penalty imposed by section 10, if he, while
acting as engineer, for his corporation, refiises to handle
iterstate freight for the complainant, and thereby, in
his discharge of a function of the company, willfully omits
to do an act reqiuired by the law to be done; and it is immaterial whether what he does or fails to do in violation
of the statute is with or eithovt The orders of his principal.
i

U. S. v. Tozer, 37 Fed.,

635.

and all the members of the brotherlood engaged
' IArthvr
1

in enforcing rule 12, and in thereby aiding and abetting
every such engineer to violate the section, are equally'
guilty with

&U

as pr incipiAs,

U. S.

v.

Syder,

14 Fed.,

554; and they are theeeby also guilty of conspiring to commit an offense against the United States and subject to the
penalties of section 5440, Rev. St.,
Fed.,

U. S. v. Stevens, 44

132.
But suppose that this view of sectioi. 10 is erroneous

and that t+e words, 'person acting for or employed by such
corporation',

refer only to its managing officerx or agent,

the enforce-ment of rule 12, with its evident purpose,
would still be a violation of law; for even then it

is quite

clear that any one, though not an officer or agent, successfully aiding,

abetting,

to violate the section,

or procuring such offiver or agent
would be punishable under it

as

120.
principle.

...

Section 1040, Rev. St.,
more persons conspire
tbe United States,

. .

.

to

provides that - 'If two or
commit any offense against

and one or more parties do any act

to effect the object of the conspiracy, all t~le parties to
such conspirac, shall be liable'.
All persons combining to carry out rule 12 of the
brotherhood against the complainant company, if any one of
them does an act in furtherance of the combination, are punishable under the foregoing

section.

This is true, be-

cause as already shown, the object of the conspiracy is to
ind'-cesprocure and compel the managing officer of the
defendant compamies to refuse equal facilities to the complainant xim~x

for the interchange of interstate freight,

which, as we have seen, is an offense against the United
States by virtue of section 10, above qvoted.

For Arthur

to send word to the committee chairmen to direct the men
to refuse to handle interstate freight of complainant, and
to"hotify the managing officers of the defendant companies
with the in+ention of procuring them to do so, all in execution of rule 12, is an act in futherance of the conspiracy to procure the managing officers of the defendant companiest'to commit, a crime, and subjects him and all conspiring with him to the penalties of section 5440, Rev. St.
Again, for the men, in furtherance of rule 12, either to refuse to handle interstate freight or to threaten to q',it,

or

actually"to quit, in order to procure or induce the officers
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of the defendnt companies to violate the provisions of the
interstate commerce law, would constitute acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and would render them also liable
to the penalties of the same section .
In the case at bar, although malice is certainly present, the illegality of the combination does not consist
alone in that, for both the means taken by the combinaLion
and its object are direct violations of both the civil and
the criminal law as embodied in a positive statute.

Surely

it cannot be doubted that such a combination is. within the
definition of an unlawful conspiracy, recognized anddopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
bone, 148 U. S.,

197, to wit,

U. S.

v. Petti-

'Acombination of two or more

persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal
or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means'.
2.

-re now come<to the character of rule 12, and

its enforcement as a civil wrong to complainant.

Lord

Justice Fry said in the case of the Steamship Co. v. 1.[cgrefor, 23 Q. B

D.,

595, 624;

'I

cannot doubt that whenever

persons enter into an indictable conspiracy, and that agreement is carried into execution by the conspirators by means
of an unlawful act or acts which produce private inj ry to
some person, that person has a cause of action against the
conspirators'.

..

Under the principle above stated, Arthur and all the
members of the brotherhood engaged in causing ±XxK

loss
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to the complainant are liable for any actual loss inflicted
in pursuance of their ctnspiracy.

The gist of an, such

action must be not in the combination or conspiracy, but
in the actual loss occassioned thereby....
3. Having thus shown that Arthur and all the members
of the brotherhood with him, conspiring by enforcing rule
12 to injure complainant, will be liable in damages to compla nant for any loss they may thereby occassion, the question remains, can equity afford any relief by prelimiaary
injunction against the defendant companies and against the
engineers, under the averment of the bill that the defendant
companies threaten to refuse to interchange freight with
complainant because of the refusal of their engineers to
handle it. ...

is,

As against the defendant companies the complainant
clearly
therefore,"entitled to a preliminary mandatory injunc-

tion to compel them pending the hearing, to discharge the
duties imposed by the interstate law, and to exchange with
complainant interstate freight.

(Follows last case.)

. . .

If a preliminary mandatory injunction may issue against +he defendant companies to pervent irreparable injury,
it may certainly issue against their officers, agents, employes, and servants.

...

Nor is the mandatory injunction against the engineers
an enforced specific performance of personal service.
is only an order restraining them, if they assume to do the
work of the defendant companies, from doing it in a way
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which will violate riot only the rightd of the complainant
but also the order of the court made against, their employers
to preserve those rights.
They may avoid obedience to the injunction, b,. actually ceasing to be employes of the company.

...

We finally reach the question whether Arthur

=$

can

be enjoined from ordering the engineers to carry out rule
12.

That he intends to enforce the rule, if not enjoined,

is not denied.

If, as we have seen, the injury intended is

of such a character that the court may issue its mandatory
injunctiol against tha engineers to prevent them from inflicting it, Arhtur may certainly be restrained by prohibitory injunction from ordering them to inflict it.V
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ANTI-TRTIST LA! or SHERMAN ACT.
Act of Congress, July 2nd, 1890;
26 Stat. at L. 209.
Let us next consider the Act of Congress of July 2,
1890, commonly known as the Anti-Trust law, in its relation
to strikes and boycotts.

The sections of the act which

affe-ct tVe questions under discussion are the 1st, 4th, and
'6th.

They are as follows:Every contract, combination in the form

i.,'iSection 1.

of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.

Every person who

shall make any contract or engage in any such combination
o-r conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemmanor, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one yewr, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the c cirt. ,JI*e
Section14.

'

The several circuit courts of the United

States are hereby invested with jtrisdiction to ,!revent and
restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty
of the several district attorneys of the United States, in
under the direction og the Attorney-generJwL
+-heir respective districts,"to institute proceedings in
equity to prevent and restrain such violations.

Such pro-

ceeding may be by way of petition setting forth the case
and praying that such violations be enjoined or otherwise
prohibited.

When the parties comrlained of shall have
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been duly notified of such petition the rCourt dhall proceed
as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the
case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the
court may at any time make such temporary restraining order
or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
Section 6.

Any propertly owned under any contract or

by aiy combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy

(and being

the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act,
and being in the course of transpor-.ation from one State to
another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the
UInited States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceeding as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure and condemnation of property imported into this country contrary to law.
It must first be noticed that the act creates no
right in equity in favor of a private ]e-son or persons.
Sec. 4, and Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed.,

40; aff'd 56 id.696.

In this case Judge Billings said, "The injunction has
asked for, first, undert
Known as

the act of 1890,

been

(26 St. p. 209.)

'An act to protect trade and commerce against un-

lawful restraints and monopolies'.

This acts makes all

combinations in restraint of trade or commerce unlawful, and
fuinishes +hem by fine or imprisonment, and authorizes suits
at law for triple damages for its violation, but it gives
no:new right to bring a suit in eouity, and a caref,1l study
of the act has brought me +o the conclusion that suits in
eqvity or injunction suits by an" other than the government
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of the

1Thited States are not authorized by it.,
In T1. S. v. workingmen's Amalgamated Council, Judge

Billings held that the act applied to combinations of workigmen as well as combinations of capitalists and granted
an injunction.

6See U. S. v. A.ger.)

The bill "avers that

a,disagreement between the warehousemen and their employes
been
aud the principle draymen and their subordinates had"adopted
by allathe organizations named in the bill, until by this
vast combination of men and of organizations, it was threatened thatq1nless there was an acquiesence in the demdnds of
the subordinate workmen andoraymen, all the men in all the
defendant organizations would leave work, and would allow
no work in any department of business; that violence was
threatened and used in support of this demdand; and that
this demand included the interstate and foreign commerce
which f~ow57 Fed.-,l I In

through the city of New Orleans'

(Aff'd in

85.)t,
.Traterhouse v. Comer, Judge Speer said that the

rule offihe B. of L.E. which was considered in the Toledo
PQc.lPy. case wou1cd, if enforced, liolate the act.
In U. S. v. Elliott, Judge 7hayer held that "a combination whose rprofessed object is to avrest the operation
fo railroads whose lines extend from a graat city into adjoitiing states, until such roads accede to certain demands
made upon them, whether such demands are in themselves reasonable or unreasonable, jujst ov unjust, is certainly an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the states"
and withi, the statute.

An in

junction waw

granted --e-
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straining the defendants "from doing the acts threatened, in
pursuance of the alleged agreement.'

These acts were "that

the several defendants have uombined and conspired to induce persons in the employ of the said railway companies
to leave t},e service of their respective companies, and to
prevent them from securing other operatives.'
case reported in 64 Fed.,

in the same

27, the demurrer to the bill was

overruled by Judge Phillips.
In Thomas v. Cincinatti p c. Ry. Co.,

one Phelan was

punished for contempt for violating an injunction and the
act of Congress in question -'as cited to sustain the jurisdiction of the court in gxx
said Phelan.
in

U. S.

v.

gxx~x

$.xxx1:xm

commiting

The Circuit Court also relied on the Statute
Debs but the Suipreme Court

laced its

decisirn

on other grounds.The nice question to lie solved in the cases
arising under this statute, is, does the statute apply to
lawful as well as unlawful restraints and does it apply to
restraints where the object is not primarily directed againt
interstate commerce?

In all of the cases except U. S. v.

Elliott unlawful means were clearly fsed.

In, this case

the use of no lnlawfu:l means were charged but it

war

alleged

"that it is the purpose and object of the defendants who are
engaged in the aforesaid conspiracy to secure to themselves
the entire control of int erstate commerce"? &c.
Freight Ass'n, 166
on this point.

U.

9.

v.

J '. 9., ±6, is a very interesting case

It wasn't a strike case but some of "he

principles laid down are worthy of notice.

It was held
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that it wasn't necessary to prove an intent to restrain interstate commerr'e,

but if such restraint is the necessary

effect of the agreement that is sufficient and further that
(in this

-ease) the agreement

"though legal when made, be-

came illegal on the passage of the act of July 2, 1890"
The act is certainly ver:j broad and no one can tell how far
the courts

xN

will go in construing its p.rovisions.

U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n of Cal.,
fl.

S. v. Addystone Pipe

Kteel Co.,
S

85 Fed.,
85 ved.

2.92;
271.

See,
and
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"OMNIBUS" INJUNCTIONS.
,A great deal has been written and said about
injunctions, i.e.,
a certa-i

act.

'omnibug

onerestraining all the wotid from doing

It seems to me that there is a great mis-

conception of the

Law governing this question.

case an injunction was granted

In the Debs

"khereby the defe-ndants, and

all persons combining and conspiring with them, and all persons whomsoever, were commanded and enjoined"&C.

It is

claimed that the form of this injunction is unwarranted by
the practice of courts of equity.

It is undoubtedly true

that an injunction is never granted against persons who are
not parties to the suit.
Fellows.

Iveson v. Iarris.

Schalk v. Schmidt.

Fellows v.

State v. Anderson.

But

"the order will, if nesessary, be extended to his (deft's)
servants, workmen, and agents, and it is of course to insert
these words'

Toledo ecc.

Ry. Co. v. Penn Co.,

742, and authorities cited.

54 Fed.,

730,

It also seems to be settled

that one not named in the injunction order may be commi~ted
for contempt if he knowingly 'assist or abets' the person
enjoined.

Seward v. Paterson, 1897, 1 Cu.,

545;(citing

Wellesley V. Earl of 1Iornington,; Lewes v. M organ; and Avery
v. Andrews.)

State v. *;emd

Wimpy v. Phinizy.

It

may seem paradoxical that one can be committed for contempt
when he could not be enjoined;

The difficulty is clearly

explained in Wellesley v. Mornington.

An injunction was

granted rest~raining the defendant from cutting timber but
it did not by its terms include his servants of agents.

It
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was moved to commit one Batty, an agent of the defendant,
"for a breach of the injunction"'
said,

The r.'aster of the Rolls

"You do not ask to commit him for th-e contempt, but

for the breach of an injunction by which he is not enjoined.
I think the objection~fat al to this fo-'m of mzix notice of
motion; but I by no means think, that because Batty is not
enjoined in his character of servant and agent, he cannot
be punished for knowingly aiding and abstihing lord ',ornington in doin-- that which this court expressly prohibited
The plaintiff then moved '"to commit him for the contempt,
in being party and privy to, and in aiding and assisting the
breach of the injunction, which restrained the defendant,
the Earl of Mrrnington from cutting timber"&c. ,Batty at the
time knowing that these a'cts were forbidden"
the Rolls now said:

"By the forbearance of the

The M,
aster of
:laintiff, I

am ppared the painful necessity of making an order.

If the

matter had been pressed, I should have found it my duty to
commit Mr. Batty for his contempt in intermeddling with thc4
these rnatters"
In Seward v. Paterson, plaintiff leased certain premises to the defendant.

The defendant covenanted not to

"do or suffer anything hoisy, noisome, offensive or inconvenient to the lessor? &c.

The defendant, 'is unde-tenant4

agents and servants were enjoined from violating this covenant.

It was alleged that the defendant disobeyed this

ordor, by holding boxing matches, upon the premises, and tht
one Shepard and lMurray had assi-sted him.

They were all com-
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(after quoting

mitted for contempt by Judge North, who said,
from Wellesley v. Mornington with approval.)

"In the present

case Muhrray was not a party to the action, and upon that
ground his counsel a-gued
contempt.

T hat

that he could not he committed for

does not follow.

An injunction to restr-

ain a man, his servants and agents, from doing any act, is
a common recognized fvum, and

the injunction can be enforced

against servants and agents although they are not parties to
the action.

Murray's counsel failed to explain why ser-

vants and agents should be liable to be committed, though
they are not parties to the action; while other persons
who had done exactly the same things could not be committed
because they were not parties to the action.

In my opinion

that is not the law; any one who deliberately assists another in committing a breach of an injunction can be punished
for his contempt of court in so doing equally with a servant
or agent of the persoi enjoined.

I think the words

'ser-

vants and agents' are inse'ted by way of warning to such per
sons, not as describing a particular class of perions, but
generally as describing assistants of the -ersonx who is
restrained'.'

Murray appealed.

On the appeal Lindley,

L. J. said, "Now, let us consider what jurisdiction the cout4
has to make an order against Murray.

Trhere is

no injunc-

tion against him - he is no moe bound by the injunction
granted agdnst Paterson than any other member of the public,
He is

bound,

like oiher member's of the public,

not to in-"k

terfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice,
an4 the case, if any, made against him, must be this - not
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that he has technically ingringed the injunction, which was
not gran'ed agaglat him in any w
that

sense of the word, but

ind abetting others to set the court

he has been aiding

at defiance, and deliberately treating the ordjer of the
he has so conducted him-

If

court as uinworthy of notice.

self, it is perfectly ddle to say tlat there is no jurisdiction to attach kim for contempt, as distinguished from
a breach of an inju3nction"
apprehend to be the true scope of the injunc-

This I

If agents and servants and persons

tion In the Debs case.

wKo assist or abet the violation of an injunction, can be
punished for contempt,

whether they be parties to the suit

or named in the injunction order, isn't it better to insert
these words

'by way of warning' so there may be notice?

The

question was not involved in the Debs case, and in Re Lennon
the contemner was clearly a servant assisting and abetting.
The only case where the question seems to have been discussIn this case Judge

824.

ed is U. S. v. Alger, 62 Fed.,

Baker says, "I think that in this proceeding the court
as Judge of t_e cDrciit court) had jurisdic-

(Judge Woods,

tion to issue this writ.

.

.

.

Now, in this case, the inl

formation, I think, lacks considerable of having the wertainty and precision that is essential.

.

.

allege,- and that is the most serious t'.-ing,

It does not
to my mind,-

that either by his words or ]is acts he was engaged in aiding the common object with other memlers of the American
Railway Union.

If what this man did was not done to give

aid or cmmfort or encouragement to the object of arresting
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the mails, if it was an independant crime the man was committing, if he wanteli to commit arson or robbery, without
having any connection with these men that were engaged in
the interruption of commerce, then he would not be within
the terms of the restraining order7

This seems to be a

correct exposition of the real meaning and effect of the so
called 'omnibus injunctlnn' granted in the Debs case.

No

broader interpretation of it would be sustained by the authorities.

134.
THE DEBS CASE.
64 Fed., 724.
158 U. S., 564.
It will be unnecessary to state the facts of this
case as they are still fresh in the minds of all.
portant qlestion is, was the action justified?

The imIt can

scarcely be doubted that if the injunction had been asked
fou by the different railroads concerned that it would have
been granted on the various grounds pointed out.

.But

the

injunction was soivrht and obtained by the United States and
it is necessary to notice the grounds on which it was based.
The injunc-ion commanded the defendants, "and all persons
combining and conspiring with them, and allrother persons
whomsoever, absolutely to desist and refrain from in any
manner interfering wibh, hindering, obstructing or stopping
any of the business of any of the following named railroads,

(naming roads) as common carriers of passengers and

freight between o-" aong the States of the United States,
and from in any way or manner interfering wi~h,hindering,
obstructing or stopping an,, mail trains, express trains or
other trains, whether'

passenger, engaged in interstate

commerce, or carrying passengers or freight between or among
the States; and from

in any manner interfering wihh, hinder

ing, obstructing or stopping any engines, cars or rolling
stook of any rnf said companies engaged in interstate commerce,, or in connection wil-h 'he carriage of passengers or
frei.-ht between or among the States; and from in an. manner
interfering with, injuring or de.troying ani of the proerty
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of any of said raily'oads engaged in or for the purpose of,
or in'connection with, interstate commerce or the carriage
of the mails of the United States or the transportation of
passengers or freight between or among the states; and from
entering upon the grounds or premises of an. of said railroads for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, obstructing or stopping any of said mail trains, passenger or
freight trains engaged in inter ;tate commerce, or in the
transportation of passengers or freight be t ween or among the
States, or for

-he purpose of interfering with, injuring or

destroying any of said property so engaged in or used in
connection with interstate commerce or the transportation of
passengers or property between or among the states; and from
injuring or destroying any part of the tracks, roadbed, or
road or permanent s~ructures of ,aid railroads; and from
injuring, destroying or in any way interfering with any of
the signals or swithhes of said railroads; and from displacing or extinguishing anj of the signals of any of said railroads, and from spiking, locking or in any manner fastening
any of 'he switches of an- of said

-'ailroads, and from un-

coupling or in any way hampering or obstructing the control
by any of said railroads of any of the cars, engines, or
parts of trains of any of said railroads engaged in inters+ate commerce or in the transpor~atin of passengers or
freight between or among the states; or engaged in carrying
an:, of the mails of the U3Aited States; and from comp~lling
or inducing or attempting to compel or induce, by threats,
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intimidation ,persuasion, force or- vlolence, any of the em-

,

A1loyes"'f any of said rail'oadsin connection with the interstate business or commerce of suci- -ailroads or the carriage
of the United States i-ails by such -ailraods,

or the

trans-

purtation of passengers or property between or among the
states; and from compelling or inducing or attempting to comipeli

or induce by threats, intimidation, force, or violence
rail
any of +he employes of any of said"roads who are employed by
bych railraads, and engaged in its service of interstate
commerce or in the opera 4 ion of any of its trains carrying
the mail of the United States, or doing interstate business,
or in the Ptansportati(n of passengers and freight between
anIJ among the states, to lea--ve the service of the slid
railroads; and from preventing~erson whatever, by threats,
intimidalion, force or violence from entering the service
of any of said railroads and doing the work thereof, in the
cqrrying of the mails of the United States, or the transpot
tation of passengers e. freight between or among the States;
and from doing an. act whatever in furtherance of any conspiracy or combinati',n to restrain either of said railroadx
companies or receivers ilkthe free and unhindered control
and handling of in+ters+.ate commerce over, the lines of said
railroads and of tiransportation of persons and freight between and among the states; and from ordering, directing,
aiding, assisting, ol- abetting in any x

manner whatever,

any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts
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aforesaid 7'
"The scope and Piurpo.-se of the bill was only to restrain forcible obstructions of the highways along which inu
terstate commerce travels and the mails are carried.

And

the facts s t forth at length are only those which tencied to
show that the defendants were engaged in such obstructions"'
"An examination of the order shows that it consiststu
of two parts, though they are not separated.

The first

portion envmerat es the,particular things which the defend-i.
ants may !:ot do, and those things av'e all in themselves unlawful and injurious.

But, among then 1he persuading of

employes to quit the servicex of the r$Alroads is riot included; the only ise of the word
forbidding *"

ersvade' is in the clause

defendants to induce employes in the service

of said rail-oads to refuse to perform their duties as employes of sait railroads engaged in interstate commerce, "or
the carriage of the United States mails.

It does hot for-

bid them to use persuasion to induce employes to quit the

servic(,e.
"The second portion of the order, embracing the last
two clauses, frbids the doing of anylact - even though it
be lawful in itself- in furtherance of any conspiracy, or
combination to restrain either of the railroads from freely
controlling and handling interstate commerce, and also
forbids the ordering, directing, aiding or abetting any person to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid"
-'t, The decissinn was based on the grounds (1) protection
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of the mails;

(2) protection of interstate

to prevent a public nuisance.
thorilies that

(3)

It is clea" from the au-

the United States has a prop irty riht

mails -tnd this right should be protected
injury.

commerce, and

in the

from iireparable

The duty to govern interstate commerce is given by

the constitution and

+he jurisdiction of equity under the

interstate commerce act and the anti-trust law would
be undoubted.
diction on

However the court did

the statutes but

se,im to

not rest its juris-

on the gcound

"that the govern-

ment of the United States is one having jurisdiction over
every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly
upon each citizen;

that while it is a government

of enumer-

ateci powers, it has within the limits of those powere all
the attributes of sovereignty;

that to it is committed power

over interstate commerce and the

transmission of the mailx;

thAt the power thus conferred upon the haticnnal gove-nment
are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practical execcise by the legislation of Congress; that ink the
exerecise of those powers it is

competent for the

nation to

remove all obstructions upon highways, natu'al or artificial
to the passage of in+erstate commerce or the carrying of the
ma i ls '1.
On the

third ground the court proceeded upon the

thepi

that intersta4 ,e railways are highways and thatt the obstruction of the highwa, was a public nuisance and could
joined.
right,

"A public nuisance is

be en-

a violation of a public

eithbr by a direct encroachment ufon public rights

lo9.

or property, or by doing some act which tends to a common
injury, or by onitting to do some act which the common good
requi.es and which it is the duty of a perso, to do, and
the omission to do which results injuriously to the public.1
Wood on Uuisances (2 Ed.)

29.

At page 259, he says,

"Any

unreasonable obstruction of a highi'ay is a public nuisance"'
Applying these rules to the facts of the case it is evident
that

4 here

was a sufficient obstruction of a public highway

to constitute Ainuisnce.
Was the Debs case justified?

It would seem to have

been clearly justified b,/ the authorities.

If the acts of

the defendants in that case had not been restrained it
seems that nothing could be the result but disorder and
anarchy. -JI-.:our government is so weak, if it has not the
power to restrain such acts, it is certainly a weakness that
must prove fatal +o ifs stability.
A government that
and thus protect its granted powers
cannot restrain and stop such acts of lawlessness"is certain
ly in danger of anarchy and the legitimate prey of the socialist.
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There can be little adde.,d by way of conclusion.

I

have carefully examined the cases bearing on the question
and my conclusion have been stateu at variois places in this
thesis.

When I began studying the question I supposed from

the popular clamor raised agaiist it,

that the Pebs case was

the first and only one where an injunction had been iused in
these troubles.

But I find that the State courts have

been thus settling these coXtr9ersiVV
1875.)

in this State from

If confined within propcir limits, and applied to

all with an impartial hand, it is certainly a beneficient
use of judicial authority; but if the courts continue to
apply it in cases like the Oxley Stave Co. case and Barr v.
Essex Trades Couincil and refuse to apply it in cases like
the Continental Ins. Co. and the Mogul case,

then it comes

far from being a proper use and is certainly a judicial
discrimination against the masses in favor of the classes.
Properly used it is not only justifiable, but it is a good
thing for the public benefit.
Pomeroy says, "that the common law theory of not interfering with persons until they shall have actually committed a wrong, is fundamentally erroneous; and that a remedy which prevents a threatened wrong is in its essential
nature better than x

a remedy which permits the wrong to
the
be done, and attempts to pay for it by"pecuniary damages
which a jury may assess.

The ideal remedy in an,; perfect

system of administering justice would be that which abso-
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lutely precludes the commission of a wrong, not that which
awards punishment or satisfaction for a wrong after it is
committed'

It seems to that Pomeroy is right whenever such

a preventive remedy is practicable, and it certtinly is in
these cases.
Finis.

APPENDIX.
The earliest American case I have been able to find where
the injunction was used in labor troubles is Muller v. Grantz.
It is unreported and is simply mentioned in Vol. 2, Cent. L. J.,
308.

I wrote to the attorneys in the case and received the

following replies:-

New York, February,12,98
H. M. Merrihew, Esq.,
Cook place, Ithaca, N. Y.
My Dear Sir:
2n answer to your note of the 16th, I beg to say
that according to my best recollection, no opinion was written by
Judge Barrett in the case you refer to. It was ah application by
Mr. Mueller, who was a manufacturer of clothing, to restrain his
workmen who were on a strike, from interfering with other employss
I appeared -or the defendant and opposed the motion.

Judge

Barrett denied the application for an injunction on the spot, and
therefore wrote no opinion, expressing his views orally.

From

my recollection , I can give no further information, and as the
papers have all been stowed away among the dead wood of the offi,
it would take a long time to resurrect them.
Regretting that I cannot give you fuller information?

ii.

I remain,
Yours truly,
A. J. Dittenhoeffer.
New York, feb. 17th, 1898.
H. M. Merrihew, Esq.,
1 Cook PLace, Ithaca, N. Y.
Dear Sir:Yours of the 16th inst. at hand and contents noted.
I enclose a copy of my register in the case referred to.

All

the papers are on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court.
It was an aptempt to put down a strike in equity, upon the
theory that such a combination was unlawful as a combination in
restraint of trade, and -here was ho remedy at law.

It was

successfuil then because the trade unions had not invoked the aid
of politics to help them, and they were not so adroit then with
boycotts and relied more upon threats and intimidati-on.
Inter (politica) silent leges.
Yours respectfully,
William Hildreth Field.
Mr. Field's Register.
Supreme Court.

Action for Relief, Injunction.
Dam. $5000.

Augustus F. M uller,
against
Henry Ggantz, William Grantz, Eckhardt
Schade, George Debes, John Leipple,
Christoph Landahl, rank Rezae, Frederick W. Pich, Franz Adamek, John Scheick,

Frederick Kupper,,John Simansky,
Conrad Diederick, Gustav Hoffman, John
Grede, William Wollf, A. Becker, John
P. Gatterden,
Hanschild, Henry
Kring, John Weisheimer & John George Ebel.

1875.
Mch. 31
Apr. 2d

Complaint sworn to by plaintiff.
Filed undertaking on injunction and obtained order of
injunction.
Donohue J.
a
Served summons and complaint on John Grede and William
Wollf also affts. on injunction and order of injunction on same at 441 Sixth St. and order of injunction
on William Hector and George Debes on 14th St. near
Broadway, Service George Gordon.
"
8
Filed affidavits and summons and complaint in Co.
Clks. office.
"
14
Filed note of issue.
"
20
"Recd. notice of appearence of all defendants. Runbull
& Englehardt, 320 Broadway.
"
2B
Case on Cal. at Chambers No. 108 set down for Friday
for argument.
"
21
Consented that all defendants have ten days from date
within which to serve their answers.
May 1st.
Gave defts. 10th days further time to answer.
Apr. 23
argued motion, decision reserved.
May 5,
Order of injunction modified & limited to threats &c.
"
5
Recd. notice of Runkell & Englehardt removal to
Tribune Building Rooms 45 to 48.
"
"
Received proposed order for settlement on the 7th inst
7
1 Proposed orders submitted by both sides for settlement
" 10
Order as submitted by Plff settled.
11
Recd. copy answer.
Admr.
" 12
Served copy of injunction on Atty.
ETC.
" 24
Served notice of trial on attys. for June 1871 adme.
" 27
Recd. cross "
" 29
Filed note of issue.
Pd $3.00
June 11
On Cal.
Marked off Term.
July 13
Obtained order to show cause why Frederick W. Pich
should not be committed for contempt returnable the
19th of July, 18752
Opening of the Court.
"
13
Served Frederick W.Pich on 141h between University PL
& B'way with order to show cause and affts. Etc.
2
19
Mgtion for contempt adjd. to July 22 at 12 M.
22

2
Aug.
"

29
5
10
12

"

"

"

July 29

"

"

August 5th at 12 M.

"

"

2

0

2
"

"

Motion argued. Order of reference entered and Sinclame
appointed Referee totake evidence.
Interrogatories to
be served within twenty days.
Served copy order on atty.
Admr.

Time to serve and file interrogatories extended to
Sept. 9, 1875 by consent.
Sept. 8th, Time to serve and file interrogatories extended 20
days or to Sept..28, 1875 by consent.
"
28
Consented that the time be extended L10 days in addition to file interrogatories.
1876
Jan. 5
Case on Calendar, marked off term.
Aug. 30

1877
"

Jan. 5

"

"

"

f

Ithen wro'e to Mr. Field asking if he would have one of
his clerks make me copies of the injunction order and opinion.
I received the following reply from Mr. Trabold:New York, Feby. 24th, 1898.
Mr. H. Merton Merrihew?
i Cook PLace, Ithaca, N

Y.

Dear Sir:Herewith I enclose you a copy of the order in the cae.
of Muller against Grantz as per your request in your Letter to
Mr. Field.

As there has been no opinion filed in this case a

copy cannot be obtained.
I also enclose you my bill for $1.00.
Yours &c.,
Henry Trabold.
Order of Judge Donohue.
N. Y.

Supreme Court.

------------------------------ x
Augustus F.

Muller

against
Henry Grantz, william Grahtz and others.
------------------------------

x-

e

On reading the cpmplaint inthis action duly verified,

also

V,

the affidavits of Augustus F. Muller, David Reis, Ludwig Meffrt,
and Charles Croissant, it is ordered that the defendants (naming
them) and their and aach of their attorneys, counsellors, agents,
assistants and associates and each and every of them under the
penalties by law prescribed and each and every of them do absolutely desist and refrain from interfering with the employment of
workmen by Augustus F. Muller by stoppbng workmen at and about t1
entrance of the place of business of the plaintiff No. 42 East
14th Street, and inducing them to persuasions and threats not to
enter his employment or otherwise, and from interfering with his
workmen in returning to their respective homes with materials
to be made up, by following them on the way, on inducing them by
persuasions and threats to

return material received by them with-

out making up the same or by payments of money causing such
workmen to deliver the material to themto return the same or alk
otherwise, and from interfering with his workmen at their a4
4.44- respective homes by calling on them and inducing them by
persuasions and threats to return the material received by them
without making up the same or by payments of money causing such
workmen to deliver the material to them, to return the same or by
causing others to call upon them to accomplish such results, and
from interfering with his workmen in returning to his Place of
business, No. 42 Ea st 14th Street, and in being re-employed by
him Augustus F/Muller, by stopping such workmen on the way or
inducung them by persuasions and threats to return :n their work
and refuse to be re-employed or'otherwise and from interfering wt
with the business of Augustus F. Muller in any manner or form
whatever.

vi/
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants show cause before this eourt at a Special Term thereof, to be held at Ckambers
thereof on the third day of April, at 12 o'clock noon, or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard, why this order should not be
continued in force until the fuirther order of the Court in the
premises; and for such other and further relief as may be jist.
April, 2nd, 1875.
Charles Donoghue,
J. S. C.
Final Order.
At a Special Term of the Svpreme
Court held at the Chambers thereof at
the County Court House in the City of
New York on the 10th day of May, 1875.
Present,
Hon. George C. Barrett,

Justice.

Augustuis F. Muller,
Plaintiff
against
Henry grantz, William Grantz, & ors.
Defendants.

On reading and

'iling the complaint herein and the affi-

davits of the plaintiff, David Reis, Ludwig Meffert and Charles
Croissant and the injunction order granted herein on the 2nd day
of April, 1875, and the order to show cause why the same should
not be continued on the part of theplaintiff, and the answer and
affidavits of all the defendants, and after hearing Widliam
Hildreth Field of Counsel for Plaintiff in favor of said motion,
and A. J. Dittenhoeffer and C. A. Runkle in opposition,
ORDERED that the injunction muJst be confined to intimida-

vii/
tions and that the defendants

(naming them)

and their and aach

of their attorneys, counsellors, agents, assistants, and associat
and each and every of them under the penalties of law prescribeJ,
do absolutely desist and refrain from acts of intimidations towards workmen seeking employment from Augi;st's F. Muller to induce them riot to enter his employmaxt, and from any acts of intimidations towards workmen in his employ to induce them not to
perform the services agreed to be performed by them respectively
or not to continue in such employ, or not to be re-employed by
Augustus F. Muller, and from caiseing others to use or employ
any acts of intimidations to accomplish the same ends until the
order
further"of tNx Court.
Enter,
G. C. B.
There is one other strike case

(Moorhead V. Krause) of

which I have been able to obtain no record or report.
is mentioned in 11urdock V. Walker, 152 Pa. St.,

The case

595.

Ihave found but one boycott case mentioned that is'nt reported.

It is mentioned in 14 N. J. L. J. 162, where it is

stated that a. full report of the case was printed in the Sacramento Bee of Nov. 20, 1390.
but was uhable to do so.

I tried to get a copy of that issue
The following letters give the only

history of the caseI have been able to obtain and also explain
my inability to get copies of the report.
Sacramento, Cal.? March 2/98.
Mr. H. M. Merrihue,
1 Cook PLace, Ithaca,N.Y.
Dear Siv:

viii.
Referring to your favor of Feby. 7th, asking if we could
supply copies of the issue of NOv. 20th, 1890, of THE BEEcontaina full report of THE BEE boycott case, and the now celebrated
decision of Judge Armstrong.
copy of this date for you.

We have been unable to obtain any
You will not find it in the Cali-

fornis reports, since it was a decision by Judge Armstrong of the
Superior Court of this Couhty, which would undoubtedly have been
affirmed, but the strikers refused to permit it to go to the
Supreme Court.

The title of the case was C. K. McClatchy et al

vs G. W. McKay et al.
A typewrttten copy of the matter might be made fo1

your

use, but the expense perhaps would be too large, under the circumstances.
Briefly, the occasion of the suit was the fact that the
united tradex unions of

4-he

Ct~y had organized a boycott against

THE BEE because it refused to reinstate a certain discharged employe, discharged for incompetehcy, and they were threatening
trades people that, if they did not withdraw their advertisements
from THE BEE, and the subscribers that if they did not cease to
subscribe for it,
and in otherx ways.

that they would be punished by loss of trade,
Our suit was in the nature of an injunction

against 17,0 or 200 named leade-s cir .he various trade unions in
this City, who were prominent in the boycott proceedings.
The
and
injunction was obtained &gaxxt the leaders were fined for contempt of Court, Judge Armstrong rendering the decision referred&
Respectfully yours,
Janes McClatchy & Co.

ix/
Sacramento, Cal. Mar. 8, 1898.
Mr. H. M. Merrihew,
# 1 Cook Place, Ithaca, N1 Y.
Dear Sir:- You cannot get a copy of a Bee thit yoiu mention.

The

only way that yoii would be able to get that is by having a copy
of the decision made.
Yours ter7g truly,
Philip S. Driver.
0.
Sacramento, Cal.

March 15/ 98.

Mr. H. M. Merrihue,
Ithaca, N. Y.
Dear Sir:
Ihave your favor of March
McClatchy & Co.,

th, addressed to James

in reference to a copy of the Armstrong decision

which has been referred to me for answer.

the decision is a

long one, and being bound in book form, as the file of papers is,
it will be very dificult for one to copy.

I will do the wore,

compare copy and make two carbons, if you desire, for $10.

Of

course I am only estimating about how much work there is to do,
and if

it

whould fall

accordingly.

If

short

off ri

you desire

estiamte,

T -viii 'eb

e you

the work dore at 1tgr&xbzxx

that figure, and wire , as you suggested in your letter, address
me personally, as by so doing it will save some time.
Jessie Davis?
Stenographer, THE BEE.
In 1 Ry & CORp. L. J.7112, it is stated that an application for an injunction was made by one McFadden against the
Compagnie Generale Translantique ,
other record of the case.

Ihave been able to find no
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